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Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy1
Introduction & Methodology
Pennsylvania, like virtually every industrialized state, invests heavily through a large 
number of economic development incentives and technical assistance programs to 
promote job creation in high-technology industries. In normal economic times, such a 
diverse and costly set of expenditures would certainly merit scrutiny; with the nation’s 
deep recession depressing state and local government revenues for several years, there is 
far greater urgency now to ensure that such investments are effective.
This study examines the Commonwealth’s high-technology economic development efforts 
through several lenses, and compares them to those of six primary competitors in the 
so-called “economic war among the states”— the neighboring states of Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio and West Virginia as well as North Carolina. 
The study focuses on industrial sectors that all or most of the seven states have identified 
as strategic targets, including synthetic fibers, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, 
plastics, computers, semiconductors, electrical equipment, and transportation 
equipment.
In addition to case studies and program summaries, the study uses two unique analytical 
tools that have never before been applied to Pennsylvania and have only been used in 
published studies in a handful of other states. 
The first is the TAIM	 ez model created by Profs. Alan Peters and Peter Fisher. This 
is a proprietary “representative firm” tool that employs algorithms to compute 
how corporate taxes and incentives in an average city in each of the seven states 
interact with typical financial statements of actual firms in eight manufacturing 
sectors. The TAIMez model builds upon extensive published work  Fisher and 
Peters have done on the effectiveness of tax-based incentives. 
The second is the National Establishment Time Series, a proprietary database 	
purchased for this study and analyzed by consultant Doug Hoffer, a pioneering 
NETS user. NETS is a longitudinal file on all business establishments created by the 
California-based consulting firm Walls & Associates in conjunction with the credit-
reporting firm Dun & Bradstreet. Unlike annual government data, which are based 
on survey samples, the NETS database covers virtually every workplace in the 
state. 
2The study also explores an alternative economic development strategy that centers on 
high-technology skills instead of companies. Labor economists Stephen Herzenberg 
and Mark Price analyze the Occupational Location Quotients—the degree to which 
people with specific skills are geographically concentrated—for major metro areas in 
the seven states. Arguing that clusters of highly skilled engineers and other workers are 
critical competitive advantages to drive the development of technology-based firms and 
industries, they explore how Pennsylvania can strengthen its economy and reduce its 
investment risks by reinforcing those skills advantages. 
This study also summarizes, but could not evaluate, the seven states’ large menus of 
business assistance available for high-technology companies. Besides programmatic 
descriptions, as possible it also includes budget costs and issues raised by oversight 
reports such as audits. 
Finally, the study provides eight case studies of high-technology economic development 
incentive deals, one from each state and two from North Carolina. With some packages 
valued at more than $100,000 per job to as high as $1 million per job, the stories 
spotlight the high stakes surrounding such large, company-specific subsidies. 
Using all of these tools, the study explores fundamental questions about Pennsylvania’s 
economic development incentives, programs, and taxes—its high-tech “business climate,” 
if you will. They include: 
From the bottom-line perspective of a high-tech corporate balance sheet, how do 	
the state’s taxes—and its tax breaks—stack up? 
Where do most high-tech jobs come from?	
Of those high-tech jobs that leave the state, where do most go? Are many lost to 	
other states, as some news accounts would suggest? Or is offshore job flight a 
bigger problem? 
What lessons can be learned from the seven states’ experiences with some of their 	
most costly company-specific incentive deals? 
Are there alternative strategies to “putting a lot of eggs in a few corporate 	
baskets,” and what comparative advantages does Pennsylvania have in pursuing 
such strategies?
Pennsylvania has some significant high-technology strengths and advantages; the 
challenge moving forward is how to invest scarce taxpayer resources to most effectively 
build upon those strengths. We hope our unique analysis will inform state policy for a 
more prosperous future.
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Executive Summary
Based upon our analysis of Pennsylvania’s technology-based economic development 
incentives and programs, especially as they compare to those of six primary competing 
states, we offer the following key findings: 
1. There is a very narrow range of variation among effective high-tech tax rates in the 
seven states, and Pennsylvania falls right in the middle. 
Viewed from the balance-sheet perspective of a high-technology company deciding 
where to locate a new facility, Pennsylvania’s corporate tax rates and incentive codes 
generate returns on investment very similar to those in the six competing states. Indeed, 
Pennsylvania is at or near the median of the seven states in every sector tested. These 
findings are based upon a proprietary representative-firm analysis, modeling returns on 
investment in each of the states for theoretical facilities with typical financial profiles.
Pennsylvania remains in the middle of the pack both before and after research and 
development credits are accounted for, and when facilities are located in the enterprise 
(or similar) zones in each state which qualify for the most generous tax breaks. Therefore, 
whatever differences exist between the trajectory of Pennsylvania’s high-tech economy 
and those of its neighbors, it is doubtful that they can be attributed to the state’s tax or 
incentive system. (Only Ohio now deviates from the group, as it eliminated its corporate 
income tax.)
2. High-tech job creation (or loss) is overwhelmingly driven by events within the state—
not by interstate relocations.
An analysis enabled by a relatively new proprietary data set, the National Establishment 
Time Series (NETS), finds that Pennsylvania’s interstate in-migration (or out-migration) 
of high-tech jobs is dwarfed (by a factor of 28 over 16 years) by the impact of business-
establishment births, deaths, expansions and contractions. Whether positive or negative, 
the net movement of high-tech firms and jobs across the state’s borders each year 
is almost negligible compared to the impact of instate activity. Long term, interstate 
movements have been nearly a wash: over the same period, the state experienced a very 
small net in-migration of workplaces and a very small net out-migration of jobs. 
4Those facilities that do move in or out are mostly very small: more than three-fifths have 
fewer than five employees. Corporate and personal income tax rates play no discernible 
role in determining which states have received more jobs from Pennsylvania or which 
have sent the most jobs to the Commonwealth. 
3. Globalization is the dominant issue in high-tech job out-migration.
International job flight from Pennsylvania dwarfs domestic job shifting—by a factor 
of 30 for the years 2001 through 2006. Especially for high-tech manufacturing jobs, 
globalization is the dominant issue driving Pennsylvania’s job loss caused by the 
relocation of work. This finding is conservatively derived by comparing the NETS data on 
job movements to federal Trade Adjustment Assistance data, which reports on workers 
officially designated as dislocated because of offshore job flight and/or imports. 
4. High-tech deals can be “old economy,” costly and disappointing. 
This report also includes eight in-depth case studies of high-profile, high-tech deals (one 
in each state, two in North Carolina). Several themes emerge: the deals can be extremely 
expensive both in absolute terms and on a per-job basis; most of the big-dollar incentives 
provided are decidedly low-tech, “old economy” sorts of tax breaks; and some technology 
companies (even one that admonishes us “Don’t be evil”) have gotten just as aggressive 
as auto companies or Wall Street banks when it comes to playing states against each 
other for lucrative subsidy packages. 
Despite their high costs, the deals are surprisingly fragile, perhaps reflecting higher 
volatility in high-tech sectors. For example, North Carolina gave its costliest-ever package 
to Dell, but the computer assembler recently announced that more than 900 jobs are 
headed offshore after only four years of below-projected employment. New Jersey’s 
deal for pharmaceutical company Altana (later Nycomed) fell far short on projected 
job creation. Ohio’s costly deal for biotech company Amylin rests upon one diabetes 
treatment facing new, deep-pocket competition. And New York’s deal worth $1 million 
per job for micro-chip maker AMD (later GlobalFoundries) wavered for three years before 
finally breaking ground in mid-2009. 
Pennsylvania’s deal for the expansion of Westinghouse Electric in Cranberry involved 
state enactment of a new and very expensive (but low-tech) incentive. The deal clearly 
plays to one of the Pittsburgh region’s sectoral strengths and supports a longstanding 
employer. However, taxpayers were not able to weigh whether the incentive had to be 
Executive Summary
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy5
so large or whether alternative investments in the engineering and technical talent that 
supports the nuclear industry might have had a higher payoff.
Overall, these large high-tech companies in mature sectors resemble manufacturing 
companies in general; they are focused on reducing production costs, which can make 
them footloose, and which makes taxpayer investments in them more risky and less 
“sticky.”  
5. Pennsylvania has distinct high-tech skills advantages that suggest an alternative and 
lower-risk development strategy. 
If high-tech firms and industries are volatile, and company-specific deals are expensive 
and risky, a promising new strategy revolves around skills. Target key occupations, it 
suggests; identify your occupational advantages in large metro areas (as opposed to your 
business-density advantages) and play to those strengths. 
Viewed through that lens, the Pittsburgh and Philadelphia metro areas still have strong 
occupational clusters that merit investments. For Pittsburgh, the greatest strengths are 
within engineering (especially nuclear, civil, materials, mechanical, and electrical); and 
biomedical (especially physicians and surgeons as well as technologists and technicians, 
including those in clinical laboratories and related to diagnosis). Pennsylvania is just 
average in its numbers of computer and math-related workers.  
6. Tax-based incentives are low-impact but high-cost. 
Cumulatively, our findings—especially our theoretical-firm modeling and our long-term 
business-establishment analysis—mesh with a large body of national evidence that finds 
tax reductions, exemptions or credits to be crude tools for economic development. They 
can only exert a very small marginal influence on corporate investment decisions because 
other cost factors such as labor, occupancy and other key inputs are far larger than taxes 
(or tax breaks). 
Given this reality, for the vast majority of companies, tax breaks are windfalls, not 
determinants, and are therefore wasted. As well, given that Pennsylvania’s effective tax 
rates (after existing incentives are included) are so very close to those of competing 
states, its ability to stand out could only come at enormous cost. Any new tax-based 
incentives must also be weighed for their very real opportunity costs: fewer resources to 
develop skilled labor and maintain efficient infrastructure, both of which are critical to 
successful high-tech development (and that of all other kinds of employers). 
67. Pennsylvania’s high-tech incentives appear somewhat more balanced than some states’.
Despite the enormous sums sometimes committed to individual deals, our summaries of 
the seven states’ high-tech incentives find that, to varying degrees, all of them support 
diverse kinds and sizes of companies. Although we know of no way to precisely measure 
these strengths, Pennsylvania, by virtue of its longstanding programs to foster early-
stage companies, its new efforts to integrate its workforce strategy with its economic 
development system (through training consortia—“Industry Partnerships”—linked with 
key regional clusters), and to broadly diffuse the adoption of process technologies in 
manufacturing production, appears to have a more balanced approach.
That said, our findings make it clear there is room for improvement to make 
Pennsylvania’s high-tech job investments more effective, as outlined in our policy 
recommendations. 
Policy Recommendations
Our empirical and narrative findings suggest several ways in which Pennsylvania’s 
economic development investments can be reshaped to improve returns and reduce risks. 
1. First, Do No More Harm to the Tax Code
The quantitative evidence is overwhelming: Pennsylvania’s tax rates and existing regimen 
of incentives are clearly not an issue compared to those of neighboring states. As 
outlined below, the state has numerous better ways to invest economic development 
resources than granting costly tax-break packages to individual companies, or broadly 
reducing corporate tax rates. And regarding job flight offshore, state tax policy should 
not be confused with federal trade policy. 
2. Continue Efforts to Better Integrate Workforce and Economic Development
Pennsylvania is ahead of the curve in connecting its workforce investments to the skills 
gaps of regional industry clusters that pay well and in which Pennsylvania has actual or 
potential economic advantages. In more than 70 Industry Partnerships, many in high 
technology, Pennsylvania has cost-effectively brought some 6,300 business together to 
identify and meet common training needs. 
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Pennsylvania is, in essence, modeling how states can invest in “public goods for the 
21st century”—the human capital infrastructure of technology industries—a  more 
appropriate role for government than large subsidies to individual companies and a 
necessary innovation given the winds of global competition. Pennsylvania should commit 
long-term to its novel Industry Partnership strategy to “grow your own” key industries. 
It should also invest in additional evaluation efforts to fine tune the strategy and help 
Industry Partnership coordinators maximize their impact on cluster competitiveness and 
job opportunity.  
3. Build on “Occupational Cluster” Advantages That Fuel Innovation
To complement its existing efforts to strengthen various industrial “clusters” (i.e., 
targeted industries), Pennsylvania should also should build upon its most critical 
occupational clusters—its existing high concentrations of workers in occupations, such as 
engineering and biomedical, that fuel innovation and high-wage job growth. Investing in 
occupational clusters also reduces taxpayer risk because most of the people whose skills 
are developed through the investments are likely to remain in the state. 
4. Grow Your Own (Existing) Employers Rather than Recruit from Other States
Recruiting companies from other states is costly and provocative. It is also low-impact, 
since interstate movement of jobs accounts for just a fraction of one percent of the 
state’s high technology jobs. Better to retool incentives and technical assistance 
programs so that they reinforce ties between employers and place-based institutions 
(both public and private) and the ties companies in the state have with each other. 
5. Make the “Investment Tracker” a Functional Tool for Analysis
The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development’s “Investment 
Tracker” website reports on more than 240 state programs. In a 2007 report by Good 
Jobs First, it was ranked 12th among the states for on-line information about job subsidies 
(only 23 states had any online reporting). But there are critical gaps in the Investment 
Tracker reports: for example, information is inadequate or lacking on wages and benefits, 
where the money is applied geographically (i.e., does it fuel sprawl?), the industry of the 
recipient company, and whether companies actually deliver on promised job creation. The 
Tracker’s format also makes it difficult to download the mountain of (flawed) information 
into a data set for analysis.  
8Being inundated with too much data can be as disempowering as having too little. To 
make the Investment Tracker a functional tool, the state should improve its disclosure 
requirements and website to fill these data gaps and fix this download flaw. 
6. Create a Unified Development Budget
To complement an enhanced deal-specific disclosure system, we also recommend a 
Unified Development Budget (UDB): an annual report to the state legislature which 
catalogs and analyzes all forms of state spending for economic development.  UDBs are 
intended to enable legislators to see the big picture, and the patterns and trends within 
it, so they can effectively execute their priorities via the budget.  
7. Consider More Support for Small, Local and Young Businesses
Building on its history of assistance to small companies, with the aid of a Unified 
Development Budget, we recommend that Pennsylvania assess its actual spending 
priorities and consider increasing such efforts. Also relevant here is whether program 
rules seek to intentionally benefit business that are locally based. There is a small 
but convincing body of evidence that locally owned businesses generate greater local 
economic ripple effects than do branch establishments of national companies, yet a 
forthcoming study of 15 states (not including Pennsylvania), will conclude that the 
allocation of economic development incentives is profoundly biased against locally 
owned businesses. 
8. On Job Flight, Focus on Federal Trade Policy 
Runaway shops are overwhelmingly a federal trade policy issue; they are not—and 
cannot be—much influenced by state taxes or incentives. The place to seek redress on 
this problem is with Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation. Development incentives, 
especially tax-based subsidies, must not be misrepresented as a remedy for globalization-
driven job flight. Revenue needed to sustain public goods should not be lost in a 
misguided effort to overcome offshoring. 
Executive Summary
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How Taxes and Economic Development Incentives
Affect Returns on New Manufacturing Investment
in Pennsylvania and Surrounding States
A representative-firm analysis of manufacturing facilities with high technology 
content was performed, modeling theoretical facilities with typical financial 
profiles. It finds that Pennsylvania’s corporate tax rates and economic development 
incentive codes generate corporate returns on investment very similar to those in 
surrounding states and North Carolina. 
This remains true when research and development credits are included, and when 
the theoretical facilities are located in a state’s most-generous enterprise zone 
area. (The only anomalies are Ohio as it eliminates its corporate income tax and a 
Maryland program that only applies to distressed counties.)
Cumulatively, these findings are consistent with a large body of evidence that 
argues that tax reductions, exemptions or credits are only able to exert a small 
marginal influence on corporate investment decisions because other cost factors 
such as labor, occupancy and other key inputs are far larger. 
The findings also indicate that for the vast majority of companies, tax breaks are 
windfalls, not determinants, and are therefore wasted. The only certain outcome 
of lost tax revenues are the opportunity costs: fewer resources to develop skilled 
labor and maintain efficient infrastructure, both of which are critical to successful 
high tech development.
Background: How Much Can Taxes Matter?
The ability of states to influence economic development through tax policy and tax 
incentives has been the subject of much research and controversy over the past 30 years. 
Academic researchers have generally been far more skeptical of the importance of tax 
differences than have public officials. The main reason for this skepticism is simple: 
incentives, for all their cost to state and local government, are still too small to matter 
much to corporate decision-makers. Typically, a firm’s wage bill will be many times 
greater than its tax bill; for the average manufacturing firm in the U.S., payroll is about 
11 times the firm’s total state and local tax burden before incentives1 and for the typical 
by Peter Fisher and Alan Peters
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service-sector firm, wages and salaries costs are a much larger share of the cost structure. 
Effectively, this means that fairly small geographic differentials in wages can easily 
outweigh what appear to be large tax and incentive differentials.
Some researchers have concluded, after reviewing a large body of research on the effects 
of state and local taxes on economic growth, that taxes have measurable but small effects 
on the state economy. How small? One meta-analysis concluded that the “elasticity” is 
about -.03.2 This means that a 10 percent cut in taxes would produce a 3 percent increase 
in economic growth over what it would otherwise have been. 
However, it is important to understand what this means effectively. In previous research, 
we have found that the average standing state and local incentive package amounts to 
about a 30 percent cut in the overall state-local tax rate (including corporate income, 
sales, and property taxes). This implies that only about 1 in 11 new jobs in the average 
community will actually be attributable to the incentives, even if incentives are provided 
for all new jobs.3 In other words, incentives “work” about 9 percent of the time, and are 
simply a waste of money the other 91 percent of the time. The incentives are provided, 
in other words, mostly to firms that would have chosen that state or locality even in the 
absence of incentives. 
Our findings are consistent with statements of site location consultants who report that 
other more important factors usually determine where a company expands or relocates: 
i.e., the availability of skilled labor, proximity to markets, access to raw materials and 
suppliers, labor costs, energy and logistics costs and other key inputs specific to the firm 
and its products or services. 
Opportunity Costs for High Technology
Even the argument that tax breaks have a small marginal effect has been challenged.4 
The most important methodological contention is that studies on tax cuts and elasticity 
assume everything else is constant, including the quality of public services. Yet as a 
practical matter, tax cuts have to be offset either by tax increases elsewhere or by cuts 
in public spending, or some of both. Many things state and local governments provide 
—especially education and infrastructure—are themselves important to particular firms 
and to the economy in general. To the extent that tax cuts actually cause spending 
to decline for quality education and upgrades to public infrastructure, even the small 
positive impact described above could be eliminated. 
This issue is especially salient for Pennsylvania’s high technology strategy because high 
tech sectors in particular demand an educated workforce, and the highly educated 
workers that high tech firms need to recruit and retain are likely to be especially attentive 
to school quality when weighing family considerations against job relocation possibilities. 
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The negative effects of state and local spending cuts on economic growth are important 
to recognize because tax incentives are expensive. There is strong evidence that they do 
not pay for themselves, though there are still many who claim that they do. The basic 
problem is this: if incentives go to every firm that meets the eligibility criteria, and 91 
percent of those firms would have located in the state even without incentives, then the 
cost of the incentives to that 91 percent will never be offset by the eventual revenue 
gains from the other 9 percent. 
This structural problem is aggravated by the fact that firms remain mobile—some will no 
longer be in the state when the incentives expire and the firms would be expected to pay 
the full freight in taxes. And the fiscal problem cannot be overcome by making incentives 
more generous. While a larger incentive package could raise the percentage of new jobs 
attributable to incentives, it also raises the cost of providing incentive windfalls to the 
majority of firms who didn’t need them and didn’t alter their decision because of them. In 
fact, the larger the incentive package the larger the net revenue loss to the state.
The Representative Firm Analysis
To assess the significance of taxes and incentives to the plant location decision in 
Pennsylvania and neighboring states, we conducted a representative firm analysis for 
eight manufacturing sectors: resin, synthetic fiber and artificial fibers; pharmaceuticals 
and medicines; plastics and rubber products; machinery manufacturing; computers and 
peripherals; semiconductors and other electronic components; electrical equipment and 
appliances; and transportation equipment
For each of these eight sectors, we modeled a 250-employee facility with industry-
average rates of capital investment, wages, energy costs, research expenses, and 
profitability. Our tax model measures how state and local taxes and incentives in 
Pennsylvania and six neighboring states vary. Specifically, it projects how building the 
same new plant in each of the states would affect the company’s after-tax profits.  
We have developed our hypothetical firm model, called TAIMez, over the past several 
years and updated it for this study.5 The model calculates, for each representative firm 
and each locality, the gross property taxes that the firm would pay each year for the 
first 20 years after a new plant is built in that locality, based on the value of its taxable 
property each year and a constant local property tax rate. The model also measures 
the state and local sales taxes paid on purchases of machinery and equipment and on 
purchases of fuel and electricity for the new plant, and the increase in state and local 
corporate income or gross receipts taxes paid (in the new-plant state and in other states 
where it is taxable), and then deducts all state credits resulting from the new plant 
investment. Federal income taxes are also modeled. 
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The result is an estimate, year by year for 20 years, of the state and local taxes, with and 
without tax incentives, attributable to the firm’s investment, and the firm’s after-tax rate 
of return on that investment.
We model state tax law for tax year 2008, relying on corporate financial and wage 
statistics for 2007. We chose 2007 both because of the availability of wage data and 
because we wanted corporate finances to reflect a more normal year rather than the 
recession year of 2008. While the tax regimes are basically those that existed for the 
2008 tax year (including the income tax payable in 2009), we incorporated changes to 
the tax laws that have already been legislated, if they are scheduled to take effect by tax 
year 2010. The result is a model of 2010 tax law to the extent that it is known as of mid-
2009. While there will no doubt be additional changes to 2010 tax law enacted over the 
next year, our findings represent the most accurate portrayal possible of the current tax 
system as it has already been legislated.  
The model includes corporate income taxes (including taxes on net income and taxes on 
net worth) and gross receipts taxes, and all corporate tax incentives that would generally 
be claimed by a manufacturing firm building a new facility. The model also includes 
sales taxes on purchases of personal property (manufacturing machinery, transportation 
equipment, computers, furniture and fixtures), and property taxes on real and personal 
property. Local incentives under the discretion of cities or counties are not modeled 
because of the sizeable variation in such incentives and the lack in most states of any 
centralized data that would enable the calculation of an average property tax abatement, 
or an average Tax Increment Financing (TIF) incentive. 
In a separate second set of data layered onto our general incentives findings, the model 
also captures incentives targeted geographically to economically disadvantaged places 
such as enterprise zones (a category that includes Pennsylvania’s Keystone Opportunity 
Zones and New York’s Empire Zones), and counties that meet distress criteria. This 
separate run reflects the maximum incentive package that a firm could receive if 
it located in such a targeted area, even including possible multiple packages from 
overlapping “zones.” 
Finally, we provide a third run that includes research and development activity credits 
layered onto general incentives (but excluding geographic zones). This is necessary 
because some states’ credits are modeled on the federal tax code, which means that the 
credit is only for R&D expenses that exceed a baseline. In a given year, some firms will be 
able to claim a credit, while others will not, since R&D investments fluctuate.  
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Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy13
Key Findings
For representative firms in eight key industries (as described in Table 1) the after-tax 
rates of return vary little among the states (with other factors held equal). Except for 
Ohio, where the corporate income tax has been replaced with a gross receipts tax, profit 
rates vary little when generally available subsidies are modeled, and when research and 
development incentives are separately layered onto general incentives. (See Table 2.) 
When incentives available only in special targeted areas are added to the general 
incentives, New York’s Empire Zone program and the One Maryland program (limited to 
distressed counties) lift rates of return in those targeted areas above rates in similar areas 
in other states. 
In other words, for a typical medium-sized high tech manufacturing facility that would be 
considered an economic development prize (similar to those profiled in the case studies 
in this report), Pennsylvania’s tax and incentive codes provide little appreciable advantage 
or disadvantage over neighboring states or North Carolina. In fact, the after-tax return 
in Pennsylvania is at or near the median of the seven states in every sector, regardless of 
the inclusion or exclusion of special incentives. Whatever differences exist between the 
trajectory of Pennsylvania’s high tech economy and its neighbors, it is doubtful that they 
can be attributed to the state’s tax or incentive system. Other factors are almost certainly 
much more influential. 
The only prospective anomaly is Ohio, which shows higher after-tax returns in every 
sector. However, this apparently reflects the fact that we are modeling 2010 tax law. 
By that year, the Ohio corporate income tax will have been completely phased out and 
replaced with a gross receipts tax (the Commercial Activity Tax). 
Among the remaining six states, however, there is generally little variation. In machinery 
manufacturing, for example, the median rate of return was 21.8 percent, with a range 
from 21.5 percent to 22.3 percent (aside from Ohio’s 23.5 percent). 
The addition of the research activities credit does not alter this general conclusion. For 
example, in the electrical equipment sector, the median rate of return was 14.6 percent, 
with the states ranging from 14.0 percent to 14.8 percent (again, not including Ohio’s 
16.4 percent).  
The inclusion of spatially targeted incentives, however, reveals Maryland and New York 
as additional outliers, due largely to the very expensive One Maryland credit available in 
certain distressed counties and to New York’s Empire Zone program with its extremely 
generous property tax credit. Among the remaining four states, after-tax rates of return 
still vary only modestly. In the pharmaceutical sector, the median return was 24.8 percent, 
with four states ranging from 24.1 percent to 24.8 percent, and New York, Ohio and 
Maryland somewhat higher.
14
Pennsylvania’s position in the middle of the seven states analyzed is not surprising. The 
most recent estimate of state and local business taxes as a share of the state economy (as 
measured by gross state product) conducted by Ernst and Young for the Council on State 
Taxation (COST) found that Pennsylvania ranked 25th among the 50 states.6 Considering 
only the seven states in our analysis, Pennsylvania was 4th (right in the middle) according 
to the COST measure. The COST study (as most others) measures the average tax falling 
on all existing firms, not the tax—net of incentives—on new investment, but the results 
nonetheless support the argument that Pennsylvania’s business taxes are average.
Concluding caveat: It is important to understand that these projected rates of return can 
only be taken as indications of the effect of taxes and incentives on rates of return, with 
everything else held constant. They cannot be taken to indicate the actual rate of return 
any specific firm would enjoy in one state versus another. Those differences would be 
almost completely driven by all the other factors entering into a location decision—costs 
of labor, land, construction, transportation, energy, and other key inputs. Because taxes 
are such a small share of costs, the overall pattern of rates of return will vary substantially 
from those shown here. The other cost factors together will invariably have a much larger 
impact on a firm’s cost structure than do taxes or the fraction of taxes avoided through 
incentives. 
Finally, other government policies bear directly upon these dominant cost factors (e.g., 
investments in K-12 education and universities, which directly affect the supply and cost 
of skilled labor), so economic development incentives cannot be viewed in isolation when 
considering how government can most effectively promote prosperity. 
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High-Tech Job Flight from Pennsylvania:
Taxes, Tax Breaks, and Globalization
An analysis of Pennsylvania’s high tech business establishments and jobs, as 
enabled by a relatively new proprietary data set, the National Establishment Time 
Series (NETS), reveals that from 1990 through 2006, the state experienced a very 
small net interstate in-migration of workplaces and a very small net out-migration 
of jobs. Far and away the dominant determinants of job creation were in-state 
events: births, death, expansions and contractions. From 1991 through 2006, they 
outweighed interstate job movements by a factor of 28. 
Those facilities that do move in or out are mostly very small: more than three-
fifths have fewer than five employees. Most net in-migrations are from neighboring 
states, especially New Jersey, New York, and Maryland. Among states to which 
Pennsylvania had net out-migrations, retiree haven Florida received by far the 
largest number; Ohio and Delaware were also minor net winners. 
Corporate and personal income tax rates play no discernible role in determining 
which states have received more jobs from Pennsylvania or which have sent the 
most jobs to the Commonwealth. 
By contrast, federal Trade Adjustment Assistance data (tracking workers dislocated 
by imports and/or offshore job flight) make it clear that international job flight 
dwarfs domestic job shifting—by a factor of 30 from 2001 through 2006. Especially 
for manufacturing jobs, the data underscore how globalization is the dominant 
issue driving job loss caused by the relocation of work. Since wage savings 
available offshore usually exceed by many times the cost of all state and local taxes 
combined, when it comes to job flight from Pennsylvania, tax rates and economic 
development tax breaks are virtually irrelevant while trade policy is tantamount. 
Though it is clearly evident that high tech employment in Pennsylvania is driven by 
the expansion and shrinkage of existing firms—not by interstate relocations—we 
found that Pennsylvania is an apparent outlier among the seven states in this study 
in using economic development incentives to entice companies across state lines.  
Instead of using interstate lures, the data clearly suggest the state should nurture 
existing businesses, reinforce clusters and supply chains, and strengthen ties with 
universities and other place-based institutions such as the Franklin partnerships.
by Doug Hoffer
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The “Economic War among the States” and Pennsylvania High-Tech Jobs
The “economic war among the states,” a phrase coined decades ago, refers to the use of 
costly tax breaks and other subsidies by some states to lure jobs from other states. It also 
refers to costly multi-state competitions for high-profile new facilities such as foreign-
owned auto assembly plants. Pennsylvania, like other older, industrial “Rust Belt” states, 
is commonly viewed as a victim of this process, suffering job flight to the South and 
Southwest. 
The economic development policy response by public officials has been an “arms race” 
that by the mid-1990s cost states and cities about $50 billion a year, with states in every 
region of the country offering enormous deal-specific packages that routinely exceed 
$100,000 per job. However, the public perceptions driving this arms race have been 
shaped more by occasional high-profile episodes rather than empirical analyses. This 
chapter seeks to carefully quantify the issue of high-tech jobs moving into and out of 
Pennsylvania so that policy can be improved.
NETS: Tracking All High-Tech Firms over Time 
Our first analysis is enabled by the National Establishment Time Series. NETS, a 
proprietary database purchased for this study, is a longitudinal file on all business 
establishments. It is a long-term project of Walls & Associates, a California-based 
consulting firm, in conjunction with Dun & Bradstreet. Unlike annual government data, 
which are based on survey samples, the NETS database covers virtually all workplaces in 
the state. 
(We use the word “establishments” in this chapter to reflect what NETS reports on: 
individual physical locations of business or industry, such as a store, laboratory or 
factory. Some companies operate multiple establishments in different locations and those 
establishments may operate in different industries. So the establishments described here 
include single-establishment firms that operate solely within the state as well as each 
Pennsylvania establishment of multi-site firms no matter where the company may have 
other locations or be headquartered.) 
The Public Policy Institute of California, a highly regarded non-profit research group, has 
published a major study using NETS after assessing the validity of this relatively new data 
source. As PPIC notes:
Dun & Bradstreet strives to identify all business establishments, and to 
assemble information on them, through a massive data collection effort 
involving over 100 million telephone calls from four calling centers 
each year, as well as obtaining information from legal and court filings, 
newspapers and electronic news services, public utilities, all U.S. Secretaries 
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of State, government registries and licensing data, payment and collections 
information, company filings, and the U.S. Postal Service. Particular efforts 
are devoted to identifying the births and deaths of establishments.
The Public Policy Institute of California concluded that NETS “gives reliable measurements 
of [employment] dynamics and provides reliable data about the sources of employment 
change and growth.”7
Key Findings
Our analysis of NETS data for the years 1990 through 2006 finds that:
The number of high-tech establishments moving into Pennsylvania from 1990 - 	
2006 slightly exceeded the number moving out (1,241 in versus 1,198 out), while 
the number of high tech jobs showed a slight net out-migration (24,942 out versus 
22,092 in). (A list of Standard Industrial Codes used for this analysis is provided in 
Appendix C1.) 
The net out-migration’s effect on overall high tech employment is negligible. 	
(Employment change is driven primarily by in-state events such as start-ups, 
expansions, contractions, and closures.) 
More than three-fifths of all moves into and out of Pennsylvania were by firms with 	
fewer than five employees.
The majority of business moves were to and from neighboring states.	
Differences in corporate or individual tax rates do not appear to explain the 	
movement to and from other states.  
The number of high tech business establishments that moved into or out of the state 
from 1990 through 2006 was nearly identical (see Figure 1 below). Activity peaked in 
2003-2004, but has since declined. The overall impact has been microscopic: the total 
number of high tech facilities that moved into or out of Pennsylvania from 1990 to 2006 
(2,439) is less than two percent of all the high tech establishments in the state during the 
period reviewed; that is, such events affected just over one tenth of one percent of high 
tech workplaces per year.8 
The net change in high tech jobs from interstate moves was slightly negative (a loss of 
2,850) but also very minor considering it occurred over seventeen years in a state with 
more than five million private-sector jobs (see Figure 2 below).
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Figure 1: Interstate High-Tech Business Moves (1990 - 2006)
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Figure 2: High-Tech Jobs Gained and Lost from Interstate Moves (1990 - 2006)
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The majority of establishments that moved in and out are very small. Indeed, more 
than 60 percent had fewer than five employees (see Figures 3 and 4). Only four percent 
of all relocations involved more than 100 employees. That is, only 86 “large” high tech 
relocations moved into or out of Pennsylvania over the seventeen years. Of those, only 
fourteen had more than 500 employees (nine out and five in).
Figure 3:  High-Tech Firms Moving Out of PA by Number 
of Employees (1996 - 2006)
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Figure 4:  High-Tech Firms Moving Into PA by Number 
of Employees (1996 - 2006)
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State Ests. Out Ests. In Net
NJ 239 332 93
NY 66 145 79
MD 69 91 22
VA 44 55 11
CT 18 28 10
MA 33 41 8
IL 27 32 5
OH 49 53 4
KS 0 3 3
MT 1 4 3
ID 1 3 2
TN 10 12 2
WA 6 8 2
CA 77 78 1
MO 7 8 1
NE 1 2 1
NM 4 5 1
OK 5 6 1
OR 7 8 1
PR 0 1 1
SD 0 1 0
AK 1 1 0
HI 1 1 0
MN 8 8 0
MS 1 1 0
RI 7 7 0
UT 2 2 0
Table 3:  Net High-Tech 
Establishment Gains by State 
(1990 - 2006)
State Ests. Out Ests. In Net
FL 166 63 -103
SC 27 5 -22
AZ 26 11 -15
TX 44 31 -13
GA 35 26 -9
NC 35 26 -9
DE 61 53 -8
AL 8 5 -3
CO 27 24 -3
IN 10 7 -3
ME 6 3 -3
VT 5 2 -3
IA 5 3 -2
KY 4 2 -2
LA 3 1 -2
NH 8 6 -2
NV 5 3 -2
AR 2 1 -1
DC 4 3 -1
MI 18 17 -1
WI 5 4 -1
WV 10 9 -1
Table 4:  Net High-Tech 
Establishment Losses by State 
(1990 - 2006)
Winning and Losing States:  What Do Tax Rates Suggest? 
While emphasizing again that the net impact of interstate relocations is virtually 
negligible, we disaggregated the origin and destination states of the high tech facilities to 
explore the importance of state taxes in business moves.  
The NETS data shows that 54 percent of the moves into Pennsylvania came from 
neighboring states (New Jersey, New York, Maryland, Delaware and Ohio). Another 16 
percent came from California, Florida and Virginia (see Tables 3 and 4). All of these states 
have lower corporate income tax rates than Pennsylvania (see Table 5).
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State Corp. % Individual % Indiv. high bracket
PA 9.99 3.07 Flat
NJ 9 1.40 - 8.97 $500,000 
CA 8.84 1.00 - 9.30 44,815 
DE 8.7 2.20 - 5.95 60,000 
OH 5.1 - 8.5 0.618 - 6.24 200,000 
MD 8.3 2.00 - 5.50 500,000 
NY 7.5 4.00 - 6.85 20,000 
AZ 6.968 2.59 - 4.54 150,000 
VA 6 2.00 - 5.75 17,000 
NC 6.9 6.00 - 7.75 60,000 
GA 6 1.00 - 6.00 7,000 
FL 5.5 0 NA
SC 5 0 - 7.0 13,350 
Source: Federation of Tax Administrators
Table 5: Tax Rates in Major Origin and Destination States
However, more than half of the high tech establishments entering Pennsylvania had fewer 
than five employees. Likely to be structured as sole proprietorships, partnerships, or 
LLCs, their owners would be more concerned with personal income tax rates. Except for 
Florida (which has no personal income tax), Pennsylvania has a lower top marginal rate 
than any major origin or destination state rate (its flat rate is only a half or a third of 
some other states’). 
Because the other states’ rates are graduated, precise comparisons are difficult. For 
example, Pennsylvania has no personal exemptions so the tax applies to the first dollar 
earned, while the other states have numerous brackets (with rates that ascend with 
income) so their effective rates on business owners with incomes below the top brackets 
could sometimes be lower than Pennsylvania’s.
In any case, if we assume the large establishments that moved into Pennsylvania are 
companies subject to the corporate income tax, the data suggests that state business 
taxes have not prompted job flight. And although the small-firm picture is slightly 
ambiguous, the fact that Florida, with no personal income tax, was the number four 
source of migrations to Pennsylvania suggests that personal income taxes are not relevant 
either.
Of the relocations out of Pennsylvania, the largest destination states were New Jersey, 
Florida, California, Maryland, New York, Delaware, Ohio and Texas. As with in-bound 
moves, a significant percentage involved neighboring states (40 percent). And while 
the corporate tax rates are lower in these states, the difference is modest as a function 
of total costs. For example, the rate in New Jersey (destination for 20 percent of the 
relocations) is less than 1 percent lower than in Pennsylvania (representing a 10 percent 
savings on state taxes). If, as federal data indicate, state taxes represent about 0.2 percent 
of revenues for a large firm,9 the savings would be equal to 0.02 percent of total revenues 
(i.e., $10,000 for a $50 million business). 
24
Given that such a small amount would be more than negated by small changes in 
dominant cost factors (such as labor, occupancy, materials or other large inputs), it seems 
unlikely that such modest tax savings could motivate a large company to move. This 
is consistent with what corporate site location consultants have long said: taxes, and 
therefore tax breaks, rarely can decide where companies expand or relocate because they 
are such small cost factors.10
With a few exceptions, the patterns of high tech job gains and losses follow the patterns 
of establishment moves (see Tables 6 and 7). The differences reflect the size of the facili-
ties that moved to and from each state. For example, Ohio was net positive in moves (53 
in and 49 out) but a few large firms moved into Ohio, so the net job impact was negative. 
While there were only a handful of moves to and from Maine, one large facility moved in 
so the jobs impact was disproportionately positive. Moves to and from California were 
nearly identical, but more large firms moved in so the net impact on jobs was positive.
State Out In Net
OH 3,774 777 -2,997
FL 2,826 460 -2,366
DE 3,894 1,561 -2,333
AZ 741 109 -632
NC 687 248 -439
TX 961 587 -374
SC 328 9 -319
MI 620 368 -252
MA 1,195 979 -216
GA 591 386 -205
TN 260 56 -204
NH 155 10 -145
MO 357 220 -137
IA 125 28 -97
DC 91 3 -88
CO 251 174 -77
AR 70 1 -69
HI 49 6 -43
KY 58 22 -36
OK 53 27 -26
LA 20 2 -18
VT 24 9 -15
NV 27 14 -13
IN 43 31 -12
AL 13 8 -5
Table 6: Net High-Tech Job Losses 
by State (1990 - 2006)
State Out In Net
NJ 3,645 6,565 2,920
ME 12 1,352 1,340
CA 1,175 2,287 1,112
NY 586 1,237 651
VA 476 1,038 562
IL 804 1,364 560
CT 180 543 363
WI 40 341 301
MD 574 783 209
KS 0 59 59
WV 29 75 46
UT 2 43 41
OR 70 103 33
MT 1 30 29
WA 35 45 10
PR 0 7 7
NM 7 13 6
MS 1 7 6
NE 2 7 5
RI 13 17 4
ID 5 7 2
AK 2 3 1
SD 0 1 1
MN 70 70 0
Table 7: Net High-Tech Job Gains 
by State (1990 - 2006)
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Births and Expansions versus Deaths and Contractions
To explore the issue further, we executed a finer-grain analysis, comparing in-state high-
tech job events to interstate movements for the years 1991 through 2006 (since this is 
year-over-year data, 1991 is the earliest trend data available). That analysis reveals that 
company events within the state—the combined job growth due to establishment births 
and expansions minus that of deaths and contractions—dwarf the impact of interstate 
job moves (Figure 5). For those 16 years, the state had 10 years of high-tech job growth 
and six years of net job loss, for a cumulative gain of 61,756 jobs. The in-state events 
generated a net increase of 64,015 jobs—or 4,001 per year—while the interstate 
movements cost the state 2,259 jobs—only 141 per year. In other words, in-state events 
have been 28 times more significant than interstate movements.
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Figure 5:  Annual Change in Net Pennsylvania High-Tech Jobs
from Instate Activity and Interstate Moves (1991 - 2006)
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Offshore Job Loss; Pennsylvania’s Real Issue for Manufacturing 
Pennsylvania has had significant manufacturing job losses from offshore job flight and 
imports (approximately 23,000 jobs have been officially certified as lost this way from 
1990 through 2006; see online Appendix C3). These job losses are often driven by 
large savings in labor costs (which dwarf state and local taxes) that can be obtained 
by relocating some kinds of operations. While exact figures are not available, the 
U.S. Department of Labor’s Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program provides 
one consistent set of data over time. (TAA certification is granted when workers are 
determined to be dislocated due to import competition or the offshore movement of 
their jobs; it qualifies dislocated workers for extended Unemployment Insurance benefits 
to assist in retraining and job search efforts.) 
As Figures 6 and 7 make clear, the number of high tech jobs lost to offshoring is much 
greater than from interstate competition (more than five times greater from 1990 to 
2006). There was a substantial increase in offshore job loss beginning in 2001. From 
that point through 2006, more than 14,000 Pennsylvania high tech dislocated workers 
were certified TAA-eligible. By comparison, during that same period, the net loss due to 
interstate moves was 457 jobs (per the NETS data). That is, international trade-related 
job loss was more than 30 times greater than interstate for those six years. Although 
there was a decline from 2004 to 2006, trade related losses spiked again in 2007 when an 
additional 2,500 jobs were lost. 
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These data may understate job loss due to globalization, because not every eligible 
company petitions (the share of potentially eligible firms that don’t petition is not known) 
and not every petition is accepted. In calendar 2007, the U.S. Department of Commerce 
received 163 petitions from Pennsylvania firms, denied 53 and certified 99, the sum not 
totaling since some petitions span more than one calendar year.11
These jobs lost offshore were not offset by jobs gained due to foreign direct investment 
into Pennsylvania. Indeed, during the same period 2001 through 2006, the number 
of jobs at majority-owned, non-bank affiliates of foreign direct investors in the state 
declined by 4,900 (from 253,900 to 249,000).12
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Figure 7:  Cumulative Pennsylvania High-Tech Job Losses
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Interstate Relocations: Induced by Economic Development Lures? 
In the course of performing this study, we were told by New Jersey economic 
development officials that Pennsylvania was aggressively offering incentives to small 
pharmaceutical companies to lure them across the state line. Realizing the potential for 
such episodes to be a costly zero-sum game, we investigated all seven states’ behavior. 
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To determine the validity of the original New Jersey complaint, we examined Pennsylvania 
Department of Community and Economic Development press releases as well as 
newspaper archives. The Department’s announcements boast of numerous subsidy 
deals (with as much as $8.2 million awarded) involving relocation of existing jobs into 
Pennsylvania. We performed the same analysis (using both state government and news 
media archives) on the other six states.13 We also queried the partner organizations 
assisting us with this study in those states. 
We found ten cases of interstate job relocations that were either announced by governors 
or via state-government press releases and included subsidy packages. Of those, one was 
into North Carolina ($2.8 million)14, one into Maryland ($600,000)15, and the other eight 
were into Pennsylvania (ranging from $200,000 to $8.2 million). However, in press clips, 
the Pennsylvania governor’s office also touted new investment in Pennsylvania thanks 
to state-supported venture capital firms. After pressing further, these appear to be the 
incentives New Jersey officials were referencing.
State-supported Pennsylvania venture capital funds rarely declare award amounts 
and only hint at relocation subsidies; however, fund-specific annual reports do report 
relocations (the Life Science Greenhouses of Pittsburgh and Central Pennsylvania, 
and BioAdvance the Biotechnology Greenhouse of Southeastern Pennsylvania).16 The 
Pittsburgh Life Science Greenhouse reports that 10 out of the 44 companies in its 2007 
portfolio were relocations. The Life Sciences Greenhouse of Central Pennsylvania claims 
to have given $1.5 million (part of a $4.6 million package) in “Relocation Assistance” to 
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC. BioAdvance claims to have relocated Phoenix S&T’s headquarters 
to Pennsylvania from Maryland. Most of the annual report citations do not say where the 
companies came from. The total number of possible relocations in Pennsylvania, including 
these venture capital firm claims, jumps from 8 to 20. 
Based on these sources, then, Pennsylvania stands out negatively, with more apparent 
cases of subsidized interstate job relocations than the other six states combined. 
Although our evidence does not prove that the other six states do not offer subsidies to 
companies moving from other states (perhaps they do it passively rather than actively), it 
certainly suggests Pennsylvania is an outlier. 
Besides the number of episodes, we also compared the size of the subsidy packages and 
the value of the subsidy per projected job. By the two additional measures, Pennsylvania 
also stands out. However, deeper comparisons are difficult because news clippings and 
press releases have inconsistent quality of detail, and some deals involve contractions 
and expansions in conjunction with relocations.17 In addition, many deals appear to have 
veered from their original job projections.
To summarize: what we can say for sure is that Pennsylvania reports job gains through 
relocation of companies from other states far more than the six competing states covered 
in this study. We make no conclusions regarding impact: the governor’s press releases 
sometimes exaggerate job creation benefits; much more detailed research would be 
needed to assess outcomes.
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Sectoral Analysis of NETS Data
Looking again at NETS, this time by sector instead of geography, most of the interstate 
job movement was in just two sectors: Standard Industrial Codes (SICs) 36 (Electronic & 
Electrical Equipment & Components, except computer equipment) and 38 (Measuring, 
Analyzing, and Controlling Instruments). (See Table 8.)
Electrical Equipment enjoyed 60 percent of the growth, and most of that was within two 
smaller (four-digit) SICs: Radio & TV broadcasting and Communications Equipment (SIC 
3663) and Electrical Industrial Apparatus NEC [Misc.] (SIC 3629).  (See online Appendix C1 
for a complete four-digit breakdown.) 
Offsetting losses were concentrated in three smaller electronics SICs: Storage Batteries 
(SIC 3691); Carbon & Graphite Products (SIC 3624); and Electronic Components, NEC 
(antennas, radio headphones & printed circuit/electronic assembly manufacturing (SIC 
3679). 
Two Digit SIC description SIC Out In Net
Electronic & Electrical Equip. & Components 
(except computer equip.) 36 3,490 5,999 2,509
Transportation Equipment mfg. 37 16 643 627
Fabricated Metal products mfg.     
(except mach. & trans. equip.) 34 79 539 460
Industrial & Commercial Machinery     
& Computer Equipment mfg. 35 591 913 322
Engineering, Accounting, Research, Mgmt. & 
Related Services 87 718 905 187
Wood products mfg. 24 70 119 49
Health Services 80 50 56 6
Motion Pictures 78 23 26 3
Communications 48 179 181 2
Misc. Retail (optical, orthopedic) 59 612 576 -36
Misc. Manufacturing 39 145 3 -142
Rubber & Misc. products mfg. 30 1,904 1,697 -207
Chemicals & Allied products mfg. 28 1,446 929 -517
Primary Metal industries 33 567 23 -544
Business Services 73 8,619 7,733 -886
Measuring, Analyzing & Controlling      
Instruments mfg.; Photographic, Medical & 
Optical Goods mfg.; Watches & Clocks mfg.
38 6,433 1,750 -4,683
Totals 24,942 22,092 -2,850
Table 8: Net Changes in Employment from High-Tech Firms Moving Into 
and Out of Pennsylvania by 2-Digit SIC (1990 - 2006)
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Similarly, 67 percent of the losses by sector were in Measuring Instruments (SIC 38). 
Most of the losses were in three sub-categories: Orthopedic, Prosthetic, and Surgical 
Appliances and Supplies (SIC 3842); Laboratory Analytical Instruments (SIC 3826); and 
Totalizing Fluid Meters and Counting Devices (SIC 3824). 
Other sectoral findings:
Most of the SIC categories had rough equivalence between jobs gained and lost.	
Business Services (SIC 73) showed a modest net loss but there was substantial 	
activity in and out. This sector is comprised largely of small firms; there were more 
than 1,400 moves in and out.
Over 80 percent of all Business Services facilities that moved in or out were from 	
three sub-categories: microfilm services (SIC 7389); computer programming (SIC 
7371); and Computer Related Services, NEC (disk conversion services & computer 
systems consultants; SIC 7379).
Of the 7,113 jobs lost in Measuring Instruments (SIC 38), 3,520 were from three 	
firms.
Other Characteristics of Relocations:  Wages, Survival, Ownership Structure and Exports
Finally, the NETS data show that jobs lost paid slightly better than jobs gained, although 
the difference is quite modest. In addition, more of the jobs that moved out were still 
active than those gained but, again, the difference is marginal. Indeed, over 40 percent of 
all jobs gained and lost during the period are inactive. And the data show that relocations 
did not affect the ownership mix (see Figure 8), although they did slightly increase the 
propensity to import and export among the state’s high tech industries. 
An identical share of firms that moved either into or out of Pennsylvania from 1990 
through 2006 are no longer active: 41 percent (see Table 9). As measured by jobs, the only 
variance is that in-bound jobs were slightly more likely not to survive, by four percent 
(see Table 10).  
High-Tech Job Flight from Pennsylvania
Status                 Out                In Total % of Total# % # %
Active 704 59 727 59 1,431 59
Not active 494 41 514 41 1,008 41
Totals 1,198 100 1,241 100 2,439 100
Table 9: Status of High-Tech Firms Moving Into and Out of 
Pennsylvania  (1990 - 2006)
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Figure 8: Legal Status of Firms Moving Into and Out of Pennsylvania (1990 - 2006)
Status           Out             In Total % of Total# % # %
Active 14,736 59 12,102 55 26,838 57
Not active 10,206 41 9,990 45 20,196 43
Totals 24,942 100 22,092 100 47,034 100
Table 10: Status of Jobs in High-Tech Firms that Moved Into 
and Out of Pennsylvania  (1990 - 2006)
The legal status of high tech establishments moving into and out of Pennsylvania was also 
very similar (see Figure 9). Corporations dominated (over 70 percent) but that includes C 
and S corporations as well as Limited Liability Companies (LLCs). Almost 30 percent were 
partnerships and proprietorships, with the remainder being non-profits. As with every 
other measure, the data shows that high tech interstate moves are largely a wash. 
The percentage of high tech facilities engaged in importing or exporting was similar for 
those moving in and out, with those moving in somewhat more likely to be importers 
and/or exporters (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Import-Export Activities of Firms 
Moving Into and Out of Pennsylvania (1990 - 2006)
High-Tech Job Flight from Pennsylvania
The wages of high tech jobs gained and lost have been nearly identical: the weighted 
average wage for SICs with net job gains was $60,826, while the average for SICs with 
net losses was $62,174 (see Appendix C2).18 (Note: These industry-average wage data 
include management and professional staff, so they exceed the wages of line workers and 
administrative staff.)
The percentage of foreign-owned high tech firms that moved into and out of Pennsylvania 
is identical (two percent each). However, job losses from departing foreign-owned firms 
were much greater than gains from firms moving in (-3,064 vs. +610). But of the jobs 
lost, almost 15 percent no longer exist because the firms are not active. Even though this 
all occurred over a period of seventeen years (so the annual impacts are tiny), it suggests 
that the state should be cautious when attempting to lure foreign-owned employers.
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The Occupational Advantage of Regions: 
An Alternative Approach to Stimulating
Economic Development
The bulk of this report explores the limitations of traditional subsidy-based approaches to 
stimulating high-technology development. If incentive-based approaches don’t deliver a 
high return on investment, however, what other options exist? The opposite of putting “a 
lot of eggs in a few corporate baskets” (i.e., granting large incentive packages to a small 
number of private entities) is investing broadly in public goods. At the top of that list 
would always come skills and infrastructure. 
This strategy is inherently more egalitarian: a skilled workforce and efficient 
infrastructure benefit all employers. As well, investing in public goods reduces taxpayer 
risk and makes regional economies more resilient to the loss of any one individual 
workplace. If a facility closes or a mass layoff occurs, the infrastructure remains, 
benefiting every other employer. Some dislocated workers may eventually choose 
to leave the region, but as a group human capital, enhanced through investments in 
education, is also non-mobile relative to individual businesses. 
In recent years, some states have targeted their skills investments to particular sectors, 
including high-technology industries. One of the most developed examples of investing 
in industry-specific skills is Pennsylvania’s Industry Partnership strategy.19 A related but 
less well-known alternative economic development strategy, deserving of more attention 
and experimentation, is to build on occupational clusters or networks (as opposed to 
industrial clusters). Prof. Ann Markusen suggests several reasons that investments in 
occupational clusters and networks make sense.20 
First, investing in occupational clusters also means investing in human capital—i.e., 	
the skills and networking of members of an occupation—which states spend too 
little on relative to investment in physical capital and which studies suggest delivers 
a much higher return on investment.21
Second, as noted above, people are less mobile than firms and thus state 	
investments are more likely to stay within the state and region. The state will suffer 
less “leakage” of its investments. 
Third, the internet makes it increasingly possible for a wide range of occupations—	
in new media, engineering, consulting, and other professions—to work primarily 
at a distance, using a mix of teleconferencing and occasional travel to maintain 
relationships with clients and customers. As a result, the export potential (meaning 
the ability to sell services outside of the metro area or state, but not necessarily 
to foreign markets) of occupational clusters is growing, especially in low-cost, 
by Stephen Herzenberg and Mark Price
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medium-sized metro areas which have good quality of life and are also within 
a few hours (or less with the advent of high-speed rail) of major population or 
manufacturing centers. (Did someone say Pittsburgh?)
Although not always explicitly acknowledged, occupational networks are often the 
source of dynamism behind industry clusters. That is, industry clusters bolster regional 
economic advantage in large part because they include highly-developed networks 
of key professionals that make the industry cluster dynamic. Occupational clusters 
attract entrepreneurs and venture capital. If a start-up company fades, the skilled 
technical workforce takes its skills to other employers; if a company thrives, it may hire 
dislocated workers. Either way, public investments in education fuel innovation and 
entrepreneurship. 
The classic illustration here is Silicon Valley, the regenerative power of which is owed 
to software programmers who move fluidly across companies and trade their latest 
ideas at local fern bars.22 But the same logic applies to publishing in New York—which is 
nourished by networks of top-flight editors who populate high-end restaurants at lunch 
time—and Hollywood, where actors, directors, agents, and producers all feed off each 
other’s knowledge and skills to sustain an advantage now approaching a century old. 
The Keystone Research Center has suggested that Pennsylvania’s high-tech investments 
should focus explicitly on bolstering occupational networks, a potentially more cost-
effective approach in Life Sciences than seeding new companies or providing them with 
venture capital.23 Investing in occupational networks would be a natural extension of 
Pennsylvania’s current workforce strategy, which, as noted, relies on grants to “Industry 
Partnerships” to bolster human capital specific to the state’s regional industry clusters.24
As a quick scan (suggesting the value of a more comprehensive assessment) of the 
potential of metropolitan regions within the seven states covered here to pursue an 
occupational advantage strategy, the rest of this section presents basic numbers on 
the high-tech occupational strengths of each state and its two largest metro areas. We 
measure occupational strength in a way that is directly analogous to the most common 
way of measuring industry strength—through location quotients.25 Occupational location 
quotients measure the strength of a regional (or state) occupation or occupational 
cluster by dividing the occupational share of employment in the region (or state) by the 
occupational share of employment in the country as a whole. Thus if an occupational 
LQ equals two the geographical area has twice as big a share of its employment in the 
occupation as does the nation.
The discussion below presents data for all seven states and for 12 metro areas but the 
text discussion focuses on the insights from this analysis for the Pittsburgh metro area. 
The additional metro areas include: Philadelphia; Trenton and Monmouth-Ocean in 
New Jersey; New York City and Buffalo-Niagara Falls in New York; Raleigh-Durham and 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill in North Carolina; Cleveland and Columbus in Ohio; and 
Baltimore and Hagerstown in Maryland. (No West Virginia metro area is included in the 
data series used for this analysis, which is the Public Use data set based on the American 
Community Survey.) 
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Occupational Advantage and Disadvantage in Pittsburgh
Engineering Occupations
Figure 10 and Tables 11 and 12 examine, in our seven states and 12 metro areas, location 
quotients for engineering occupations at the three-digit level.26 This group of occupations 
in Pittsburgh has an LQ of 1.19 compared to .88 for the 12 metropolitan areas overall. 
Pittsburgh has an LQ greater than 1.10 in six of the seven largest occupations which 
account for 84 percent of employment in this group. The three-digit occupations where 
Pittsburgh is the strongest relative to the nation and relative to the 12 metropolitans 
considered as a whole are:
miscellaneous engineers including nuclear engineers (1.62)	
civil engineers (1.41)	
drafters (1.87)	
mechanical engineers (1.2)	
electrical and electronics engineers (1.12)	
These LQs make very clear that, while the manufacturing share of employment in 
the Pittsburgh metro area has dipped to 8.6 percent, which is below the national 
average27, the region retains significant strength within engineering occupations. One 
interpretation of this is that the region’s engineering assets reflect the role of higher 
education institutions. To explore this hypothesis, we analyzed the share of engineering 
employment in the region that is attributable to higher education—and found that it 
is very small. This suggests that Pittsburgh’s engineering strength reflects the region’s 
industrial heritage and continues to generate exports out of the region. 
These findings indicate that Pittsburgh would be well served to focus explicitly on how 
it can maintain and further strengthen engineering talent that translates into high-
value exports. Should the region subsidize continuing education activities, professional 
seminars, and research projects organized by engineering professional associations, in 
some cases in partnership with engineers in universities? Should the region recognize 
through an awards program the contribution to regional prosperity of leading engineers? 
Should the region sponsor travel to production operations which draw or could draw 
upon Pittsburgh engineering talent—to help maintain the region’s competitive cutting 
edge, for marketing purposes, or both? Should the region work with local engineers to 
strategically identify innovative new production operations—operations that may be the 
first of their kind globally to reach production scale—that should be given incentives 
to site locally because this will enable Pittsburgh engineers to sustain consulting 
competitive advantages when similar operations spread to other locations? In the context 
of the green economy, how can Pittsburgh help its powerful networks of engineers to 
flourish? Should it nurture the skills base within the region’s green building and green 
products clusters with heightened attention to the potential exports that could result 
from having clusters of specialized green engineers?
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Occupations PA MD NJ NY OH WV NC
All Engineering Occupations 0.95 1.18 0.88 0.75 0.96 0.72 0.89
Civil Engineers 0.90 1.47 1.08 0.85 0.70 0.69 0.84
Drafters 1.39 0.87 0.61 0.67 0.98 0.91 0.83
Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers 0.92 1.46 0.92 0.85 0.86 #N/A 0.92
Engineering Technicians, 
Except Drafters 0.90 1.07 0.76 0.65 0.94 0.75 1.01
Industrial Engineers, including 
Health and Safety 0.91 0.68 0.80 0.73 1.31 #N/A 1.21
Mechanical Engineers 0.88 0.56 0.49 0.73 1.64 #N/A 0.85
Miscellaneous engineeers 
including nuclear engineers 0.95 1.55 1.12 0.74 0.92 #N/A 0.83
Source. KRC estimates based on 2005-2007 ACS data distributed by the Minnesota 
Population Center
Table 12: Occupation Based Location Quotients for Seven States in Engineering
The potential—and need—for an occupational approach, or a blend of an occupational 
and a nuanced industrial approach, is powerfully illustrated by research (funded by the 
Heinz Endowments) on the steel technology cluster.28 This research, by Carey Treado 
of the Center for Industry Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, makes abundantly 
clear that, while the popular perception is that the entire steel industry in Pittsburgh 
has declined, the region retains a powerful steel technology advantage. Anchored in 
continuing strength within the steel supply chain, including both engineering services 
and manufactured parts, Pittsburgh’s steel advantage is reflected in the fact that 329 of 
the 1,800 firms in the 2003 directory of the Association for Iron and Steel Technology 
(AIST) are located in the Pittsburgh region. Chicago-Gary (with 199 entries) and Cleveland 
(with 124) are a distant second and third.  
Yet Pittsburgh’s steel strength is at risk because of an aging workforce of engineers and 
researchers and also because the network connections between industry and higher 
education, and among businesses, have been neglected. What might have been the return 
on investment of a strategic redeployment of the stadium subsidies given to one of the 
region’s professional sports franchises to nurturing the occupational clusters that fuel 
the region’s continuing dynamism in steel?  What would it mean for the region to focus 
more on occupational clusters than a few large deals as opportunities may open up again 
globally in the nuclear power industry?
The Occupational Advantages of Regions
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy39
Computer and Mathematical Occupations
Figure 11 and Tables 13 and 14 present location quotients at the three-digit level for 
computer and mathematical occupations.29 Overall for these occupations, Pittsburgh has 
an LQ of 1 compared to 1.26 for the 12 metropolitan areas. In this cluster, six occupations 
account for 92 percent of total employment. Among these six dominant occupations, 
the 12 metros as a whole have a higher LQ than Pittsburgh. Below are Pittsburgh’s LQs 
for five of these six largest occupations. (In the sixth occupation, the sample size for 
Pittsburgh is below the cutoff of 30 which we use for reporting data.) 
Computer Software Engineers (1.00)	
Computer Scientists and Systems Analysts (1.04)	
Computer Programmers (0.98)	
Computer Support Specialists (1.09)	
Network systems and data communications analysts (.86)	
These figures suggest that information technology is not a particular strength of the 
Pittsburgh region. In some parts of information technology, Pittsburgh likely relies on 
outside firms and consulting services more than other metro regions. To explore this 
more deeply the region could conduct interviews and surveys with major IT consumers 
to understand better their sourcing for IT and also to understand where they think the 
Pittsburgh region is strong, adequate, or weak in IT services. The end result could be an 
occupational education and networking “import substitution” initiative (i.e., to replace 
services now imported from outside the region). 
Occupations PA MD NJ NY OH WV NC
Computer and Mathematical 0.94 2.01 1.52 0.90 0.88 0.49 0.89
Computer Programmers 0.98 1.40 1.80 1.12 0.96 0.37 0.87
Computer Scientists and 
Systems Analysts 0.97 2.09 1.66 1.00 0.94 0.56 0.92
Computer Software Engineers 0.85 2.05 1.53 0.69 0.71 0.26 0.84
Computer Support Specialists 0.99 1.52 1.26 0.85 1.00 0.63 0.89
Network and Computer 
Systems Administrators 0.90 2.58 1.43 0.87 0.94 #N/A 0.89
Network Systems and Data 
Communications Analysts 0.83 1.93 1.22 0.97 0.83 #N/A 0.97
Source. KRC estimates based on 2005-2007 ACS data distributed by the Minnesota 
Population Center
Table 13: Occupation Based Location Quotients for Seven States in Computer 
and Mathematical Occupations
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Health Care and Biomedical Occupations
Figure 12 and Tables 15 and 16 present location quotients for selected health care and 
biomedical occupations.30 This group of occupations in Pittsburgh has an LQ of 1.42 
compared to 1.11 for the 12 metropolitan areas. Whether and how much these location 
quotients represent occupational advantages that should be nurtured—or other factors, 
such as an aging population and high ratios of medical occupations per resident (i.e., 
inefficiency or high health care costs)—would require further research. 
Calculating LQs for a subset of these health care occupations as well as other occupations 
defined by the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry as part of the biomedical31 
sub-cluster shows that Pittsburgh maintains a relative advantage over its peers.32  
Pittsburgh has an LQ of 1.34 for all biomedical occupations compared to 1.22 for the 12 
metropolitan areas. Since 2000, employment in the occupations that make up biomedical 
sub-cluster has increased from 19,155 to 22,594 in the Pittsburgh region.  
Occupations PA MD NJ NY OH WV NC
All Health Care Practioners and Technical 
Occupations 1.22 1.08 1.02 1.08 1.14 1.29 1.05
All Biomedical Occupations 1.23 1.35 1.12 1.05 1.00 1.20 1.04
Clinical Laboratory Technologists and 
Technicians 1.20 1.33 1.11 0.94 0.96 1.43 1.30
Diagnostic Related Technologists and 
Technicians 1.18 0.92 0.99 0.89 1.20 0.99 1.08
Health Diagnosing and Treating
Practitioner Support Technicians 1.06 0.91 0.74 0.72 1.08 1.50 1.02
Miscellaneous life, physical, and social 
science technicians, including social 
science research assistants and nuclear 
technicians
1.30 1.56 0.86 0.83 0.84 1.18 1.07
Physicians and Surgeons 1.28 1.40 1.20 1.41 0.95 1.13 0.92
Source. KRC estimates based on 2005-2007 ACS data distributed by the Minnesota Population Center
Table 15: Occupation Based Location Quotients for Seven States in 
Healthcare and Biomedical Occupations
The Occupational Advantages of Regions
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy43
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Case Studies:  Eight Major High-Tech Deals
To get a better sense of how economic development incentives for high-tech projects 
work in practice, we undertook a series of case studies involving Pennsylvania and half a 
dozen other states. Those other states include five immediate neighbors—Maryland, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio and West Virginia as well as North Carolina, which has been one of 
the most aggressive seekers of high-tech investments in the East.
For Pennsylvania, we chose the case of Westinghouse Electric’s nuclear power research 
operation in Cranberry Township, for which the state legislature created a new form of 
incentive zone called Strategic Development Areas. 
In some of the other states, the choice of which project to include was easy. North 
Carolina had two high-profile high-tech investment deals—Dell and Google—and we 
decided to examine both of them. New York offered one of the largest incentive packages 
ever—more than $1 billion—to semiconductor maker Advanced Micro Devices (which 
later handed the operation over to GlobalFoundries), so that was a natural choice. 
In the remaining states, there were no high-tech deals of such prominence, so we tried 
to pick deals from several different industries and ones involving different types of 
companies, including those that are foreign-owned and non-profit. We also looked for 
variations in the importance and size of the subsidies offered. Here is a list of the case 
studies that follow:
Pennsylvania: Westinghouse Electric 	
North Carolina: Dell	
North Carolina: Google	
New York: Advanced Micro Devices/GlobalFoundries 	
Ohio: Amylin Pharmaceuticals	
Maryland: Battelle Memorial Institute	
New Jersey: Altana Pharma/Nycomed	
West Virginia: Kureha	
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The Company
Westinghouse Electric, founded in 1886, became a leading producer of commercial 
nuclear power plants after the Second World War. It was acquired by Britain’s BNFL PLC in 
1999 and was sold again to Japan’s Toshiba Corporation in 2006. 
The Deal as Reported by News Media
In November 2006, while Westinghouse Electric (which had just been acquired by Tokyo-
based Toshiba Corporation) was deciding where to locate a major new engineering 
facility for its nuclear power business, Pennsylvania enacted a new subsidy package 
aimed at attracting the facility and retaining the company in the Pittsburgh area.33 The 
legislation (Senate bill 854) empowered the governor to create up to four “Strategic 
Development Areas,” (including two in western Pennsylvania) for companies that 
committed to maintaining at least 500 jobs and making $45 million or more in capital 
investments within three years. The Areas would provide tax credits and exemptions 
including corporate income tax credits and a sales tax exemption for up to 15 years, 
Pennsylvania, believing it was in competition with North Carolina, enacted a special 
new “Strategic Development Areas” program to help capture an expansion of 
Westinghouse Electric’s existing Pittsburgh-area nuclear power research facilities. 
The Strategic Development Areas (SDAs) are essentially aggressive enterprise 
zones; they abate multiple state and local taxes for 15 years, but are not specific to 
high technology. 
The state also said it discouraged two neighboring localities from competing for 
the deal, but what else these localities could have offered beyond $3 million a year 
in local tax incentives by virtue of an SDA authorization is not clear. The state’s 
high-tech incentives were not credited at the time for influencing the deal and 
their value in the transaction is not evident. 
The deal clearly plays to one of the Pittsburgh region’s sectoral strengths and 
supports a longstanding employer. However, taxpayers were not able to weigh 
whether the incentive had to be so large or whether alternative investments in the 
engineering and technical talent that supports the nuclear industry might have had 
a higher payoff.
Pennsylvania Case Study:  Westinghouse Electric (Cranberry)
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three years longer than the state’s most-generous Keystone Opportunity Zone program. 
Westinghouse was expected to add a total of about 1,500 new jobs.
The next month, the company announced that it had settled on locating the facility in 
western Pennsylvania.34 It had previously said it was also considering Charlotte, North 
Carolina, and other unspecified locations. The company said it was considering both 
Cranberry and Monroeville, where it already had extensive operations. Commissioners in 
Butler County, home to Cranberry, quickly adopted a resolution supporting the creation 
of Strategic Development Area for Westinghouse.35 
On March 20, 2007 Westinghouse announced it had chosen Cranberry for the new facility 
and said it would consolidate its existing Monroeville operations there as well.36 The 
company said the local tax incentives (worth about $3 million a year) were the same in 
both locations but that Cranberry offered a better site for expansion and construction 
savings. 
Details from Public Documents
Our open records request to the state’s Department of Community and Economic 
Development for correspondence and documents yielded only one document: the 
Opportunity Grant Program contract signed by the state and Westinghouse in 2008. The 
grant provided the company $1.65 million to defray capital costs relating to the new 
facility in Cranberry. 
Our request to Cranberry Township also did not yield any significant correspondence with 
Westinghouse. This apparently reflects the fact that by formally authorizing the state-
designated Strategic Development Area, the township surrendered its local property tax 
revenue and had little else to do. We received a letter to the town board of supervisors 
from Gov. Ed Rendell dated January 2, 2007 (before the company made its final location 
decision) in which he said that if SB 854 had not been passed “we would have faced 
the very real possibility of losing a Pennsylvania legacy company and its 3,000 jobs.” He 
further stated that he did not want to “foster a competition” between the towns being 
considered and would instead help the company “reach a decision in their best interest.” 
The Town Manager replied to the governor on January 19, noting that the township had 
approved a resolution in support of SB 854 (authorizing the Strategic Development Area). 
The township also provided a copy of the development agreement it entered into with 
Wells REIT II-Cranberry Woods Development in connection with the Westinghouse site. It 
makes no reference to any incentives.
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Conclusion
What is most significant about this deal is that Pennsylvania, despite its many existing 
subsidies and other technology programs, felt it necessary to pass special legislation 
that created an entirely new discretionary program to satisfy the needs of Westinghouse. 
That legislation amounts to an extension of the Keystone Opportunity Zone program 
(basically an aggressive enterprise zone) and is not specific to high-tech industries. The 
Opportunity Grant the company received from the state is also not limited to high-tech 
companies. As in the Battelle deal in Maryland, it appears Pennsylvania’s array of tech-
oriented incentives played no role in this deal. 
The Strategic Development Area program, by automatically inserting the Governor into 
the process, basically obviates local negotiations. Once the township approved the 
designation of the Area, Westinghouse apparently had no real need to negotiate with the 
candidate towns.  
More broadly, this costly deal was not widely debated or scrutinized, perhaps because 
it clearly plays to one of the region's sectoral strengths and involves a longstanding 
employer. The muted debate meant that taxpayers were not able to weigh whether the 
incentive had to be so large or whether alternative investments in the engineering and 
technical talent that supports the nuclear industry might have had a higher payoff. To his 
credit, Gov. Rendell intentionally discouraged a bidding war within the Pittsburgh region, 
something that cannot be said of his North Carolina counterpart in the following two 
cases.
North Carolina Case Study:  Dell (Winston-Salem)
In 2004 North Carolina rolled out the red carpet when Dell, then riding high in the 
computer business, was looking for a location for a new assembly plant. The state 
ended up providing an astounding $242 million subsidy package for the company, 
and then allowed Dell to stoke competition among localities and wrest another 
$37 million from local authorities.  
 
In October 2009 it became clear that all that was for naught as the company 
announced that it would close the plant after only four years of operation. It 
turned out that lucrative subsidies were not enough to prevent Dell from deciding 
to turn its production over to outside contractors operating in Mexico and other 
low-wage locations.
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The Company
Dell Inc., the company that revolutionized the way personal computers were produced 
and distributed, has been struggling to adapt to a world moving away from desktop 
machines. Based in Round Rock, Texas, the company had 2008 revenues of about $61 
billion. 
Fear rippled through north-central North Carolina in September 2008 when word leaked 
that Dell Inc. was trying to sell “most and possibly all” of its factories over the next 18 
months.37 Six months later, the harsh realities of a rapidly changing personal computer 
market materialized: Dell began the first of two rounds of layoffs at its Winston-Salem 
plant. By May 2009, Dell employment in Winston-Salem stood at just 1,140, down from 
1,400 in January.38
Then in October 2009, after only four years of production, Dell announced the facility 
would close, dislocating the last 905 employees. The company's Trade Adjustment 
Assistance petition stated that the “work will be given to third-party providers who 
operate in Mexico and other countries around the globe.”39
Just five years earlier, the company had arrived in the Triad region (Winston-Salem-High 
Point-Greensboro) with the promise of creating “1,500 jobs.” The assembly facility had 
been subsidized with an unprecedented $242 million economic development incentive 
package from the state and a $37.2 million package of local subsidies from Winston-
Salem and Forsyth County. 
The layoffs and shutdown came as no surprise to close observers of Dell, a Fortune 100 
firm founded in 1984. The company, which assembled desktop PCs in North Carolina, had 
lost its marketplace leadership to firms with better laptop entries long before the current 
recession. Indeed, 2004—the year Dell’s top officials won massive tax concessions from 
North Carolina to locate its third U.S. manufacturing facility in Winston-Salem—was the 
company's last high growth year (20 percent-plus increase in sales). By 2008 its profits 
had fallen to $2 billion on $61.1 billion in sales, less than the $3 billion in profits earned 
on $49.1 billion in sales in 2004.
These 2009 marketplace realities were of little consolation to local officials, who 
demanded after the layoffs were announced that Dell representatives appear before both 
the county and city councils to explain the job-creation shortfalls.40 After the shutdown 
announcement, public outrage prompted officials to scramble to recoup as many of the 
tax breaks as they could.41
Long gone was the jocularity that prevailed at the plant’s October 2005 groundbreaking 
ceremony, when Gov. Michael Easley presented CEO Michael Dell with a ceremonial plate 
decorated with the state seal. “I got it out of the [governor’s] mansion,” Easley quipped. 
“After dealing with this group and this region on this project, it’s all I had left.”42
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The Deal as Reported by the News Media
North Carolinians learned their state was competing for a “computer-related company” 
on June 10, 2004 when the Triad Region’s Business Journal reported that Forsyth County 
had applied for a job training grant from the Golden Leaf Foundation, which had been 
created with state tobacco settlement money to foster economic development. The grant 
was to help lure an “unidentified company.”43 Robert Leak, president of Winston-Salem 
Business Inc., confirmed that the grant was for $41 million over ten years. The plant was 
dubbed “Project Merlin.”
Two weeks later, the Business Journal’s capital bureau confirmed that Gov. Michael Easley 
had gotten personally involved by meeting with Dell Inc., the previously unnamed suitor. 
“Although other Triad counties might be considered for the plant, state-level sources said 
that the company appears to be focusing its inquiries on Forsyth County,” the story said.44 
From that point forward, news reports in the region focused public attention on the 
idea that their political leaders were engaged in a fierce bidding war with unnamed 
competitors. “County Competes for Dell,” the page one headline Winston-Salem Journal 
headline screamed in mid-June. “Competition for project to be stiff, officials warn,” the 
subhead cautioned.45 Dell refused to comment on its plans. The Business Journal returned 
to the story in August when it reported that Dell was “eyeing more than one Triad suitor.” 
The story recounted an Oklahoma bidding war for a Dell call center, and suggested “free 
land and abatements” were standard for landing a Dell facility.46  
Despite these early signals that the state was engaged in a major effort to lure a Dell 
manufacturing plant, the Department of Commerce kept the negotiations almost entirely 
out of the news until late October. The only inkling of the magnitude of the subsidy 
package came from a brief Associated Press report in July pegging the package at $109 
million, which was picked up by the local paper in Winston-Salem but nowhere else.47
Then, a fortnight before the November 2004 general election (at which he stood for 
re-election), Gov. Easley called a special session of the General Assembly to consider 
major tax breaks for Dell. The session was set for two days after the election. The 
announcement set off a flurry of news reports and editorials. At least one story focused 
on the low projected pay of the jobs (average wage $23,000 to $27,000) and legislators’ 
inability to get details about the package until the last moment.48
Again, most of the coverage focused on the bidding war. It was left to columnist Jeff 
A. Taylor at the Carolina Journal to express the gnawing fear that the state was being 
taken for a ride. (The Journal is an online publication of the market-oriented John Locke 
Foundation, which has long criticized the state’s economic development efforts.) Dell 
needed an east coast plant, he argued, and the Triad region’s huge pool of displaced 
furniture workers were ideal for the computer assembly “screwdriver” jobs being created 
by Dell. “North Carolina may well have succeeded in paying millions for something the 
state could have had for free,” he wrote.49 (The Triad is also an excellent shipping point 
for Eastern U.S. markets, served by Interstates 40, 77 and 85 and close to 95.) 
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But Taylor’s story was too little too late. Special legislation creating unusual new tax 
breaks for large computer manufacturing facilities passed 33-15 in the Senate and 92-18 
in the House on Nov. 4. The votes got less attention than Dell’s decision on Nov. 9th to 
come to the Triad area. 
Only then did the full scope of the state offer become known: not only did the legislation 
include a special tax break for large computer assemblers, but other state grants brought 
the total package to an estimated $242 million over ten years, contingent on Dell hiring 
1,200 workers and investing $100 million. “The stakes in this game are getting awfully 
high,” the Asheville Citizen-Times editorialized.
But local attention had already turned to the second bidding war about to begin—
between communities in the area. Davison, Rockingham and Yadkin counties dropped 
out of the race because they couldn’t afford the subsidies. “There’s a limit to what a 
corporation should get,” said Guilford County Commission chairman Robert Landreth. 
“They can blackmail you to death sometimes.“50  
The competition especially between Winston-Salem and Greensboro received major 
coverage. “They’re saying ‘Give us your best proposal,’” Greensboro City Council member 
Sandy Carmany said.51 “Winston-Salem is in this to win,” Mayor Allen Jones told his 
city council, saying he had offered Dell $28 million in tax breaks, “more than twice the 
amount offered by Guilford County and the City of Greensboro.”52 Company officials, 
when contacted by the local press, remained cryptic on whether they had narrowed their 
choices. “Due diligence just takes a lot of time,” Dell's spokeswoman said.53 
The local bidding war got statewide attention in mid-December with a major story in the 
Raleigh News & Observer. “The company is pitting Triad governments against each other, 
seeking millions of dollars in additional incentives before choosing the site of its third 
U.S. plant,” the story said. It focused on “demands” in “hidden documents none would 
reveal” for water, sewer and road subsidies, free land and property tax abatements. Local 
officials found the process “distasteful” and at least one blamed the state government for 
fostering the competition. “This has been like asking the kids on a playground to police 
themselves with no teacher around,” said Greensboro mayor Keith Holiday.54
On December 21, the Winston-Salem City Council approved a $37.2 million package of 
tax breaks and grants for Dell, and the next day the company made its decision to locate 
on a vacant parcel of land in the city that had been assembled specifically for the project. 
Its offer bested Davidson County ($23.1 million) and Guilford County ($12.5 million).55 
It was only after the announcement was made that a local paper revealed the intense 
lobbying by local officials desperate to win a new factory for their economically hurting 
region (the Triad area had lost 35,000 manufacturing jobs in the first half of the 2000s).56
The local paper contrasted Winston-Salem’s very public campaign with the losing bid by 
the third Triad city, High Point. “We signed a confidentiality agreement not to discuss this 
and we kept our word while these other communities were blabbing their mouths,” said 
an obviously frustrated Mayor Becky Smothers of High Point.
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Details from the Public Documents 
From the moment Dell decided to locate a new manufacturing facility in North Carolina – 
a decision that appears to have been made fairly early in the process – company officials 
placed a series of escalating demands on government officials. From a state reeling 
from lost manufacturing jobs and desperate for major new employment opportunities, 
the Fortune 100 company demanded free land and buildings, zero taxes and fees, and 
subsidized training for its new employees. It even asked for relocation expenses for its 
top managers. When questioned by the local press about its intentions, the company’s 
official spokeswoman—the ironically named Michelle Blood—refused to comment. 
Privately, Dell threatened to look elsewhere if its demands weren’t met.
The process began in November 2003 when an intake officer in the North Carolina 
Department of Commerce received a call from Dell Inc. The company was looking to 
build a new manufacturing facility. The company asserted 15 states and Canada were in 
the running. The quality of the local workforce was “very important” to Dell, but so was 
the company’s plan to locate in a small metropolitan area so that it would be a dominant 
employer and not have to compete for the area’s most qualified workers. “Labor is #1,” 
the notes from the contact said.
A few months later, Dell officials began talking about locating up to three facilities in 
the state. Dubbed the F1TC project (later Project Merlin) by state officials, the company 
informed the state it was seeking a potential site for up to 700,000 square-feet of 
manufacturing, office and distribution space near an air hub.
From the outset, the company put North Carolina on the defensive about its chances 
of landing the plants and demanded massive tax breaks. The lead state official, without 
disclosing the name of the mysterious suitor, told one of the local economic development 
officials hoping to land the firm that the company had other North America options 
to choose from. The company “initially eliminated NC from search, but VP of Global 
Manufacturing added state back due to gut feeling that state could be creative and 
address wage differential concerns,” Susan Fleetwood of the state Department of 
Commerce wrote in an email to a Greensboro economic development official.57
By late April 2004, the company and state had pinpointed the Triad region, perhaps 
because of its desire to “avoid tight labor markets.”58 Company officials led by Kip 
Thompson, vice president for global manufacturing, took a two-day tour, organized by 
the Commerce Department. Local economic development groups and public officials 
paraded their tax-break wares. Lisa Perry of the Partnership for Economic and Tourism 
Development of Rockingham County offered a 100-acre site, fast-track permitting, and $2 
million to reduce company start-up costs. Winston-Salem offered a 65 percent tax break 
for ten years; a waiver of all fees; and a grant equal to 25 percent of local sales taxes. 
Duke Power offered half price electricity for the first year.
In early May, more offers poured in. Greensboro would build a 300,000-square-foot 
facility at no cost; help obtain job development grants; install infrastructure for free; and 
forgive all real and personal property taxes for ten years. Davidson County also offered 
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total tax abatement. “I feel this project is so important to the region that it requires 
extraordinary measures to insure the location in the Triad,” Steve Googe of the county’s 
economic development commission wrote to the state's Fleetwood.
Dell, however, had bigger fish to fry than these relatively small local tax breaks. It wanted 
a massive tax deal with the state. On May 19, Commerce Department officials traveled 
to Austin for a daylong session with Thompson and other high-ranking Dell officials. 
Research universities were “less important,” notes from the meeting said. What was 
crucial? The North Carolina note taker jotted down the company’s demands. “Step 1 is 
to get to no taxes [emphasis in original]. Corp. income tax we don’t pay. Exemption from 
sales tax. Share sales taxes collected from customers . . . Look at ruboff effect – impact on 
others which is passed on to Dell.”59 
A week later, the North Carolina officials scheduled a follow-up call with Thompson, and 
then huddled to digest its implications. Again, the unsigned notes of the internal meeting 
reveal a company intent on maximizing its subsidies. “Kip perfect blunt. ‘If we made 
decision today, we wouldn’t come to N.C. – Here’s what it’ll take: 1. Free land; 2. Free 
building; 3. No taxes; 4 Training at $5 million. . . I think the state will really have to step 
up and so will this community,” the notes said.60  
At the next follow-up meeting on June 4th, Thompson turned bombastic. According to 
commerce staff notes, he lamented the U.S.’s lack of competitiveness. “(I) spend a lot of 
time outside of this country. . . think we’re on the brink of a crisis . . . other countries get 
it. I’m afraid we’re going to get whipped in econ. – not in war,” the notes said. But, “we 
truly want to continue in this country. If we can’t get states to get creative . . . we could 
have said here’s the number, but I know you couldn’t hit the number – so invited you to 
be creative. If you have another way of monetizing it . . .” 61
The following month, Thompson escalated his campaign for lower taxes in a meeting 
with James Fain, the state’s Secretary of Commerce. “We’d be better off in Texas & 
Tennessee,” he said on July 9th. “Can you be competitive with status quo? Shocks me you 
can’t. Tax burden is higher. Total cost is higher.” And again on the 15th: “I don’t think NC 
wants us . . . they have no interest in going to the next level to see what can be done. . .” 
The note taker then wrote down: “Lots of pauses.”62
The next day, Dell Inc. vice president James Fitzgerald threatened to pull out unless the 
company got everything it wanted. “Thought we were going to get treatment of no 
taxes,” he said. “There are things about our business model that create tax issues. Not 
going to get there unless creatively addressed. You have got to really believe me – the tax 
cost is the death knell.” 
Fain apparently realized that the level of subsidy Dell was demanding would require new 
legislation. So on July 28th, Fain brought Fitzgerald and Thompson to the state capital 
in Raleigh to meet with Gov. Easley. The group later went to lunch at the exclusive 
Cardinal Club. The handwritten notes from that meeting suggest the governor told the 
Dell officials that he couldn’t go to the legislature “and get no taxes for X years.” “Gov 
did a good job,” the note taker added. At the end of the lunch, Thompson gave Easley 
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an autographed copy of Michael Dell’s “Direct from Dell.” But before leaving town, he 
expressed concerns to Fain that he was “wasting his time.”63
The next month Dell’s single-minded focus on getting lower taxes bore fruit. Dan Gerlach, 
a senior advisor to Gov. Easley, outlined all the tax breaks being lined up for Dell. In an 
email to Thompson and Fitzgerald, he expressed hope that the jobs in North Carolina 
might pay as much as Dell’s jobs in Ireland, which had turned out to be better paying 
than originally expected. “As you know, most deals in North Carolina that involve special 
legislation (and this offer is extra-special on that scale) are to attract jobs that pay about 
twice as much as the average Dell salary,” he wrote.64
He expressed misgivings in a private communication to Fain and Fleetwood. “How certain 
we are that these jobs are going to last awhile and that this action would not be similar 
to subsidizing textile jobs,” he wondered. “This is a threshold issue.”65 As well, several 
legislators raised job quality issues the day before the special session, prompting state 
officials to approach Dell one last time for more details about the jobs. 
Dell gave the legislators a non-response response. “Our salaries and wages are 
competitive and vary with skills, experience and education required for each job level,” 
Cindy Oaks of Dell emailed Fleetwood on the day of the vote. Fleetwood turned around 
and assured legislators who had raised the issue that Dell offered a good benefits 
package. Rep. Verla Insko, who had triggered the exchange, gave the governor “credit for 
working with a company that has a good track record.”66
The special North Carolina tax-credit bill designed for Dell soared through the legislature 
in the two-day special session in November. There is no evidence in the North Carolina 
state files or in contemporary news accounts that Dell ever seriously negotiated with 
another state to locate a plant that would service the east coast of the U.S.   
Once the deal with the state was announced, Dell turned its attention to the competition 
among localities in the Triad. A request for proposals, put out on Nov. 10th with responses 
due back by the end of the month, said Dell was seeking “donation” of 100 to 150 acres; 
$5,000 per head job training reimbursement; abatement of all property, business and 
service taxes for 15 years; roadway and traffic infrastructure improvements; no fees; a 
temporary office for 15 people complete with telephone and internet access; employee 
relocation assistance; support for a foreign trade sub-zone designation; and “any other 
economic development incentive the Location wishes to include.”67 
Press accounts from the time suggest that local officials chafed at being played against 
one another. 
 
Conclusion   
In a national economy that has been hemorrhaging manufacturing jobs, landing a factory 
with over 1,000 jobs is truly a trophy deal. Yet North Carolina had a lot to offer besides 
tax breaks: a central location on the East Coast, service by numerous Interstate highways, 
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and low taxes. Hammered by the decline of its traditional manufacturing base in furniture 
and textiles, the Triad region also had a lot of unemployed (and underemployed) skilled 
workers ideally suited for the new jobs.
But that very economic weakness, coupled with a governor up for re-election, made the 
Triad region and North Carolina a soft target for a company aggressively looking to avoid 
taxes. 
North Carolina could have insulated local officials in the hard-hit Triad region from Dell’s 
demands for the abatement of local taxes. Yet by allowing the company to play localities 
against each other, the North Carolina Department of Commerce enabled a deal that 
stressed the tax base of an already depressed region. Now, although local governments 
will apparently claw back at least some of their tax breaks from Dell, they have lost more 
than 1,400 jobs and the tax base they would have generated—at a time when home 
foreclosures and other layoffs are already depressing revenues.
North Carolina Case Study:  Google (Lenoir)
Behind Google’s spare online image is an operation that requires massive amounts 
of electricity to run its data centers, which are also known as server farms. In 2007 
the company decided to build one of those facilities in Lenoir, a town in a part 
of western North Carolina that has not recovered from the loss of thousands of 
furniture manufacturing jobs over the past decade. Despite the company’s vast 
wealth, it did not hesitate to extract a subsidy package worth some $260 million 
from the struggling region and from the state. 
 
The package generated some controversy when it came to light after a secretive 
negotiating process, but by then the deal was pretty much a fait accompli.
The Company
Google Inc., the Mountain View, Calif.-based Internet search giant, is the leading brand 
name in cyberspace. Founded just 11 years ago, Google has grown at an exponential 
rate by tying a full range of Internet-based advertising, information and communications 
services to its core search function, whose near-monopoly status turned the company’s 
name into a verb. Google earned $4.2 billion on $21 billion in sales in 2008, up from $400 
million in profits on $3 billion in sales just four years earlier.
Virtually all of Google’s revenue comes from online advertising. Its revenue stream is 
already more than half the size of the entire newspaper industry, whose ad revenues 
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shrank 16.6 percent to $37.9 billion in 2008.68 Though it counts almost no journalists 
among its 20,000-plus employees, Google’s ad revenue will surpass that of all newspapers 
combined within three or four years if present trends continue. As of June 30, 2009, 
Google’s market capitalization stood at $134 billion, making it the tenth most highly 
valued firm in the U.S., rapidly closing in on AT&T, IBM and Warren Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway. 
In sharp contrast to its enormous public relations efforts around new software products, 
Google cloaks its physical infrastructure in a shroud of secrecy. Its corporate website lists 
22 U.S.-based headquarters, technology and sales offices and 50 similar facilities in 33 
foreign countries. But it makes no mention on its website of either the number or the 
locations of its rapidly proliferating data centers (server farms). Its annual 10-K report to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission also is mum on the subject, stating only “we 
also operate and own data centers in the United States, the European Union and Asia 
pursuant to various lease agreements and co-location arrangements.”
But industry observers are keenly aware that the company’s future prospects hinge on 
its computing capacity. Writing in Information Week in 2006, industry observer Thomas 
Claburn noted that “Google is clearly on a server farm building splurge.”69 One financial 
analyst estimated that the company operated at least 36 server farms worldwide as 
of August 2008,70 including the Lenoir, North Carolina facility profiled here that was 
announced in 2007. 
While the server farm network serves primarily as a rapid parallel processing system 
for search engine requests, it is also designed to be a “virtual” hard drive for the entire 
globe. Google’s expansionist vision puts it at the center of so-called “cloud computing,” 
where Google servers would become the centralized storage system for every computer 
user’s personal information, even as they remain the primary repository for indexed 
copies of every publicly posted web page.71 If the company achieves its lofty goals, 
dozens more communities in the U.S. and abroad will become home to Google-owned 
and operated server farms. 
The Deal as Reported in the News Media
On Jan. 19, 2007, Google Inc. announced its decision to build a $600 million internet 
processing center in Lenoir, the seat of depressed Caldwell County in western North 
Carolina. Local and state officials hailed the decision. The new facility promised to bring 
an estimated 210 jobs to a region that had lost nearly 5,000 furniture manufacturing 
jobs over the previous decade. “This company will provide hundreds of good-paying, 
knowledge-based jobs that North Carolina's citizens want,” North Carolina Governor Mike 
Easley said in a statement.
But the 13 months of secret negotiations that led up to the announcement and the 
estimated $260 million incentive package for Google left many observers fuming, and 
generated as much anger as praise for the officials who landed the high-tech prize. “We 
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have given away the farm and have gotten almost nothing in return,” concluded Lenoir 
City Council member T.J. Rohr.72 
The first sentence of the Charlotte Observer’s coverage of the announcement noted the 
tax break “brought into full view the price of pushing a struggling community into the 
21st century.” The paper forced local officials to defend their gifts to the highly profitable 
firm. “It was either offer these kinds of incentives or lose out on the whole deal,” Lenoir 
mayor David Barlow told the paper. “How do you measure the good-paying jobs and 
what they’ll do for the local economy? Lenoir needs a new identity. It’s been known for 
furniture forever, and furniture has left us. We’ve got to get diversification.”
Within days of the deal’s announcement, North Carolina newspapers began what 
would become a month-long series of stories skewering both the secretiveness of the 
negotiations and the incentives attached to the deal. “Google tried to silence lawmakers” 
in Raleigh who had been pushed to offer a special sales tax break, the Raleigh News & 
Observer reported.73 A front page story in the Charlotte Observer on February 9 noted 
there were no strings attached to the Google incentive package. It contrasted the Google 
incentive package to those offered Dell Inc. in Winston-Salem and to Google in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, saying they generated far more jobs and at much lower incentive cost 
per job.74
Other stories in the wake of the announcement exposed the lengths to which local 
officials had gone in assembling land for the company without letting local residents 
know the purchaser.75 (To help clear the title on one parcel, a couple’s divorce expenses 
were paid.) Another story documented the hefty fees collected by local law and real 
estate firms from the transactions.76
The role of Google’s site location consultants in pushing for ever-higher tax breaks for 
their client drew fire from lawmakers, some of whom argued such consultants should be 
registered and regulated as lobbyists by the state. The Charlotte Observer revealed that 
the chief consultant, Rhett Weiss of California-based Dealtek, was hired as a full-time 
Google employee during the negotiations. The paper also reported that North Carolina 
attorney Don Donadio of the law firm Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, who had been 
hired by Google for the negotiations, once told a Raleigh newspaper that the firm 
received “in the ‘lower range’ of 15-20 percent of incentives they secure.”77
The drumbeat of criticism forced local officials to respond. In mid-February, Lenoir Mayor 
Barlow and County Commissioner chair Faye Higgins published an op-ed in the Observer 
rejecting the notion they had been pressured into an unfair deal or dealt with heavy-
handedly by Google. “We characterize our negotiations as tough and hard at times, but 
always fair, which are familiar characteristics to practically all people in business,” they 
wrote.78 
But the critics weren’t dissuaded. The following day, the Observer ran a story pointing 
out that state and local economic development officials never conducted an economic 
cost-benefit analysis of the deal, despite such studies being standard practice in the 
field.79 A few days later, it became known that local officials had offered to extend a 
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property tax abatement for an additional 15 years without even a written request from 
Google.80
Then, in February 2007, the Observer reporting team, thanks to North Carolina’s public 
records law, analyzed public officials’ emails exchanged during the negotiations. They 
revealed how Google repeatedly threatened county officials with pulling out of the deal 
if its terms weren’t met. As late as September 2006, though county officials had already 
spent millions of dollars assembling and clearing land, they still didn’t know how many 
jobs Google was actually promising to bring to Caldwell County. “No one should assume 
the company has selected the Caldwell site,” snapped Donadio in a return email, the 
paper reported.81 
A week later, the confidentiality agreements signed by state and local officials became 
public knowledge, explaining why the name of the company was never revealed during 
the 13 months of negotiations, even during two public hearings held to discuss tax 
breaks for the deal.82
The uproar eventually led to national coverage of the Google deal. While the New York 
Times in mid-March highlighted the potential rebirth of an aging furniture-manufacturing 
town, its story also gave prominent play to local critics.83 Business Week, on the other 
hand, focused exclusively on “the high cost of wooing Google.” “Lenoir’s courting of 
Google offers a case study of how elaborate the inducement ritual can get,” it wrote. 
“Competitive anxiety compels the handouts: the fear that without lucrative enticements, 
companies will go elsewhere, and the bidding war is being escalated further by 
sophisticated corporate consultants expert at playing jurisdictions against each other.”84
In 2007 the North Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law filed a lawsuit in state court 
challenging the sales tax exemption granted to Google by the state.85 In late October 
2009 the North Carolina Court of Appeals heard arguments on Google’s effort to get the 
case dismissed.
Details from Public Documents
The ability of a sophisticated consultant working for a high-profile company to 
manipulate state and local communities was on full display in Lenoir, public records 
reveal. From the very start, Google’s representatives insisted upon total secrecy, raised 
the specter of interstate competition, promoted intra-state competition, and then, after 
a local site was selected, sustained fears of a collapsed deal if maximum tax breaks were 
not offered by both the state and local governments. 
The process began in mid-November 2005 when Taliver Heath, using an unidentified 
gmail account, emailed the North Carolina Commerce Department about “a large, high 
technology company” looking to build a major data center. “We are looking at a number 
of locations across the country, but have some early indications that conditions may be 
favorable in North Carolina.” 
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The company’s “primary decision making criteria” involved access to and the cost of 
electricity, Heath wrote. But he also asked about communities with “favorable tax rates.”86 
Two days later, in a conference call with department officials to discuss what tax breaks 
were available in the state, Heath said other areas under consideration for the facility 
included Delaware, Pennsylvania and “others out west.”87
The next month, Rhett L. Weiss of Dealtek, Ltd. arrived, representing the still unnamed 
Internet company. After some preliminary discussions, the state arranged a competition 
among eligible counties, which took place on Dec. 13, 2005 in the offices of Duke Energy 
in Charlotte. In a daylong session, Weiss and Arrakis Napius of Zenzu Consulting in Santa 
Clara, California heard presentations from Burke, McDowell and Caldwell counties.
In January, the consultants visited potential sites in Caldwell and Rutherford counties 
as the county-against-county bidding war continued. In February, Rockingham County 
offered full water and sewer to a site at no cost to the company, a 100 percent waiver of 
business personal property taxes and a 50 percent waiver of franchise taxes. The City of 
Lumberton offered 400 acres and 4.55 cents-per-kilowatt hour electric rates.
Caldwell County officials felt compelled to bump up their offer. In a letter sent Feb. 8, 
2006, they promised to increase the exemption from all business personal property taxes 
and the 75 percent property tax abatement from 20 years to 30 years.88 On Feb. 22-23, 
Weiss made his second trip to Caldwell County to scout out the site. This time, no other 
location was on the itinerary prepared by the North Carolina Department of Commerce.
However, someone told officials in Gaston County, which lies between Charlotte and 
Lenoir, that the beauty contest wasn’t over. In early March, the executive director of the 
Gaston County economic development commission wrote Weiss a letter saying “we are in 
a position to move quickly.” A week later, Weiss again returned to Caldwell County for a 
full day of discussions about the leading site. But he continued to promote the idea that 
the final decision remained up in the air. The next morning, his North Carolina commerce 
department itinerary included a quick visit to a Gaston County industrial park en route to 
the Charlotte airport for his trip home. 
In early May, Weiss turned his attention to maximizing state tax breaks. The Google 
consultant requested a complete exemption from state sales tax on the computer 
equipment the company would be purchasing to equip the facility. Don Hobart of the 
commerce department wanted to do a state “fiscal impact” statement from the change. 
He asked Weiss in an email how much equipment would be included in the deal. “I’m not 
sure how this question is even arising,” Weiss snapped back in an email. “This project will 
not be in NC if sales tax is accessed [sic].”89 
State officials by now knew they were dealing with Google. Weiss’ email address was 
rhettw@google.com. The Dealtek intermediary role was gone. But the consultant turned 
employee continued to insist on total anonymity for Google.  
Over the next month, Weiss worked closely with department officials to craft legislation 
exempting (or rebating) sales taxes not only on equipment but also on electricity 
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purchases. When a legislative drafter proposed a fiscal impact statement, Weiss emailed 
Commerce Secretary James Fain to question “the legislature’s odd requirement to show 
a hypothetical fiscal impact of losing illusory tax revenue that the state never would 
receive? Without the legislation being passed with its correct substance, our project will 
not proceed in North Carolina.”90
State officials scrambled to meet the company’s demands. In late June, the state budget 
included the sales tax exemption as designed by Google. It passed without notice. 
Meanwhile, the Commerce Department turned its attention to gaining a Jobs 
Development Investment Grant (JDIG) for Google, which would eventually turn into a 
$4.77 million subsidy. At a special meeting of the department’s Economic Investment 
Committee (EIC), attorney Hobart said the company was so concerned about 
confidentiality and keeping the project secret that “it is presently weighing whether 
the risk of being unable to maintain confidentiality exceeds the benefit that could be 
obtained by applying for a grant.”
But the cat was soon out of the bag anyway. On July 21, the Charlotte Observer reported 
that Google had North Carolina’s Caldwell County on a short list of potential sites for 
a new computing center. The main attraction? Electricity at 4.18 cents per kilowatt-
hour compared to twice that level in other parts of the country. Deep in the story, the 
paper revealed that the special exemption passed by the state legislature would save the 
company an estimated $3 million a year in sales taxes.91 (Server farms use a great deal of 
electricity both to run the computers and to cool the facilities.) 
When it eventually released its records from the negotiations, North Carolina redacted 
every mention of the amount of electricity Google planned to use at the site, making 
it impossible to estimate the value of the electricity sales tax exemption.  Indeed, “A 
Report of the Economic Impact of a new Data Center on Caldwell County, North Carolina” 
prepared by Chester J. Pankowski for the Caldwell County Economic Development 
Commission was never completed, in part because the consultant couldn’t get all the data 
he needed from the company.
County officials by late summer began the arduous process of acquiring the land for 
Google. The mayor went door-to-door soliciting options on the 35 homes that would 
have to be purchased for the project footprint, the Lenoir News Topic reported in August. 
Even though the Observer had already reported that Caldwell County was in the running 
for a Google facility, the local paper would only report on community speculation about 
the new facility, ranging from a nuclear power plant to a Smirnoff Vodka plant. 
In early November, the commerce department once again turned to the pending JDIG 
grant. Chief counsel Hobart wrote Google’s Weiss to ask for a firm commitment to the 
project. “It has been the EIC’s sound practice to make public awards of JDIG grants prior 
to or in conjunction with a company’s commitment to proceed with a project in the 
state,” Hobart noted. “As a practical matter, the date on which the public grant award is 
made typically serves as the date beyond which the state would no longer rely upon the 
confidentiality protections . . . as a basis for withholding public records.”
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Google’s Weiss, on the other hand, still wanted to delay that public announcement. 
On December 18, Caldwell County’s Economic Development Commission held a 
public hearing on tax abatements for a mystery company called Tapaha Dynamics. 
The abatement voted at the meeting was now up to 80 percent for 30 years. Caldwell 
County was in competition with “not only other [jurisdictions] in the United States but 
throughout the world,” one commissioner said. Google got the larger abatement.
The following day in Raleigh, the state Commerce Department’s EIC held a close-door 
session to consider Google’s JDIG application. Stewart Dickinson, a member of the 
committee, complained the company’s paperwork was “significantly different from others 
for which grants had been awarded under the program in terms of the volume of asserted 
trade secret data.” Fain drily noted that Caldwell County officials had just voted a massive 
tax abatement without publicly releasing the company’s name.  
Weiss was then invited into the room. “Any decision by the company to locate activity 
in one location over another is weighted heavily on competing factors,” he told the EIC. 
He conceded the company might be willing to make its commitment within a week if it 
got the grant. Yet he couldn’t resist the temptation to make one last demand for an extra 
year to meet its job creation requirements (80 percent of the 212 jobs promised in the 
application within 12 years).
Three days after Christmas, the EIC met one last time to consider the Google application, 
approving it unanimously. The next day, the citizens of Caldwell County finally learned 
that Google was their mystery suitor. “A mystery no more,” the News-Topic said in 
reporting the state’s decision to give the $4.77 million JDIG to the Google project.92
Conclusion
The irony of giving massive tax breaks to a highly profitable, high-technology company 
was not lost on local pundits. After the Raleigh News & Observer reported the deal 
would top $100 million for the 212 jobs (the package is now estimated at around $260 
million),93 columnist Scott Mooneyham bitterly decried the hypocrisy of business leaders 
who demand high-performing schools while avoiding paying taxes, citing  Google CEO 
Eric Schmidt’s $90 million in 2005 stock options versus the lost property tax revenue for 
local schools.94
Throughout the 13 months of negotiations, Google insisted it had proprietary reasons 
for insisting the talks be kept secret. But Google is a near monopoly in its niche. Its 
demand for secrecy put the communities within North Carolina into a classic “prisoners’ 
dilemma,” forcing them to engage in a bidding war against one another.
The state’s commerce department was the enabler of this bidding war. Should it be 
excused because it feared competition with other states? That threat—made from the 
very outset by Google—appears refuted by the real driver of its location decision: cheap 
electricity—a commodity North Carolina in general and Caldwell County, which had lost 
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5,000 manufacturing jobs in the past decade, had in abundance. 
In late December 2006, just as negotiations were reaching their final crescendo in North 
Carolina, a South Carolina newspaper carried a report that Google was considering a $750 
million, 400-job investment in that state.95 Was this the feared out-of-state competition? 
No, today, both facilities are up and running. 
Google’s need to build server farms both in the U.S. and across the globe continues 
unabated. These expansion needs make it an ideal target for a multi-state compact 
among public officials against tax-break competition. 
New York Case Study:  Advanced Micro Devices/GlobalFoundries (Malta/Stillwater)
After an unknown period of wooing, upstate New York landed a trophy deal 
in 2006: a new micro-chip fabrication (“chip fab”) plant in Saratoga County by 
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD). The incentive package totaled a remarkable 
$1.2 billion for about 1,200 jobs, or $1 million per job. Among the subsidies: the 
project was granted Empire Zone status under a rule that enables projects outside 
traditional, distressed zone areas to qualify.
The deal then wavered for three years as AMD struggled financially, received an 
equity infusion from a new foreign partner, and created a new entity to which the 
facility incentives were transferred. The project finally broke ground in June 2009, 
with full staffing levels not expected until early 2014.
The Company
The deal was initiated by Advanced Micro Devices Inc. (AMD), the second largest producer 
of semiconductors, though it lags far behind industry leader Intel in market share. AMD, 
which had $5.8 billion in revenues in 2008, sold its chip fab business to Abu Dhabi-based 
GlobalFoundries, which inherited the subsidy package. 
The Story as Reported by News Media
On June 2, 2006 the Albany Times Union broke the story that state officials were 
putting together a $1 billion incentive package to lure AMD to the Luther Forest 
Technology Campus, which occupies 1,350 acres in the Saratoga County towns of Malta 
and Stillwater.96 AMD would build a $3.5 billion semiconductor fabrication plant that 
would employ up to 1,000 people. AMD and economic development officials would not 
comment, but then-State Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno (in whose district the 
facility would be located) confirmed that AMD was considering the deal. 
Case Studies:  Eight Major High-Tech Deals
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy63
There were soon reports that AMD was also looking at other sites, including one in 
Marcy, New York, outside Utica.97 In an article seven months later, the Times Union 
reported that AMD had looked at 14 sites across New York.98 As part of his high 
technology economic development strategy, then-Gov. George Pataki had eight years 
earlier targeted chip fabrication plants—or “chip fabs”—and designated 13 places in 
upstate New York as “shovel-ready” for them.99 Chip fabs require a large footprint of land, 
a reliable supply of electricity, and a lot of water.  (There were also later reports that New 
York’s main competition was Germany, where AMD already had chip fabs.)
When news broke of the possible project, the value of the state’s package reportedly 
rose to $1.2 billion, including a capital grant of $500 million, Empire Zone benefits of 
$250 million, research incentives worth $150 million and $300 million in infrastructure 
assistance. 
On June 23, just 21 days after the project was first made public, AMD and Gov. Pataki 
announced that the company had chosen the Luther Forest location and would receive 
the $1.2 billion package. The New York Legislature approved the package later the same 
day. The project's projected permanent job count was revised to about 1,200 so that the 
subsidies would total about $1 million per job. 
A July 13 article in the Times Union reported that economic development officials from 
the Capital Region had first approached AMD four to five years earlier.100 The article said 
the “mission was facilitated by officials from Glimmerglass Ltd., a business development 
firm in Menlo Park, Calif., just outside San Francisco. Local officials, including [Ken] Green 
[president of the Saratoga Economic Development Corp.], Kelly Lovell, chief executive of 
the Center for Economic Growth in Albany, and LaMar Hill, a Capital Region consultant 
who previously was director of development for Albany NanoTech, met with Bill Siegel, 
a senior executive from AMD.” Green is said to have hired M+W Zander, a German 
engineering firm that has done extensive work for AMD, to assess Luther Park as a 
potential site for a chip fab AMD was planning. 
The group later visited AMD’s plant in Dresden “and met with officials from Silicon 
Saxony, a consortium of German semiconductor companies, and heard about the 
economic incentives it takes to attract a chip fab. It was then that the local officials 
learned that a $1 billion incentive package was the global standard for a chip fab,” the 
Times Union reported.  
On July 28 the paper reported that Green’s Saratoga Economic Development Corp. 
had mailed an eight-page pamphlet touting the AMD project to residents of Saratoga 
County.101  The article suggested the mailing was designed to preempt possible opposition 
to the subsidies and the facility itself. On September 18 the Times Union ran a piece 
noting that there was no firm timetable for the construction of the chip fab by AMD and 
that the company’s agreement to do so was non-binding, though on October 21 the 
newspaper reported that company and state officials were working on a binding deal.102 
In October the board of the Empire State Development Corp. approved the largest 
part of the subsidy package—a $650 million grant—and scheduled a public hearing 
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for November. At that hearing, speakers such as Ron Deutsch of New Yorkers for Fiscal 
Fairness questioned the wisdom of the subsidy package and the claim that the project 
would yield the $1.5 billion in economic benefits. Others, including the Sierra Club, 
voiced concerns about the project’s environmental impact. Nonetheless, in December the 
state Public Authorities Control Board approved the $650 million grant. After the vote, 
AMD signed a grant disbursement agreement that gave the company a two-year window 
(through July 2009) during which to move forward with the project and apply for the 
grant. 
Throughout 2007 the Capital Region waited for a ground-breaking, as AMD suffered 
disappointing financial results and rumors that it would be taken over. In June there were 
reports, confirmed by AMD, that the company was considering partnering with another 
company on the chip fab. In November, AMD announced that it would be receiving a $608 
million equity infusion from Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala Development Co. The following 
month, AMD secured an option on the land for the chip fab. Soon after that, the Saratoga 
County Board of Supervisors designated the Luther Forest Technology Campus an Empire 
Zone, setting the stage for another facet of the subsidy package. 
Yet the uncertainty continued into 2008 as AMD failed to make a definite commitment 
to the project. In October 2008 AMD announced a new approach to the project: it 
had decided to sell its existing chip fabs to a new Abu Dhabi entity called Advanced 
Technology Investment Co., which would also be the majority owner of another new 
entity, The Foundry Co., that would build the new facility in New York. AMD, which would 
be a part owner of Foundry, proposed to transfer the planned subsidy package to the new 
entity. 
In December 2008 the Public Authorities Control Board approved the transfer of the $650 
million grant to Foundry, which in March 2009 was renamed GlobalFoundries. The new 
company continued to receive cooperation from state and local officials in the transfer 
of AMD’s approvals and subsidies. However, the company initially would not commit to 
using union labor in the construction of the facility, then valued at $4.2 billion. Under 
pressure from the building trades, Gov. David Paterson’s administration stepped in and 
negotiated a deal under which union wages would be paid by the general contractor, 
M+W Zander, and its subcontractors. It later came out that the state added $15 million 
to the subsidy package for GlobalFoundries, apparently as an inducement for it to agree 
to the project labor agreement. 
On June 15, 2009—three years after the deal was first announced—bulldozers finally 
began clearing land for the chip fab. 
Additional Information from Public Documents
In response to a freedom of information request to the Empire State Development 
Corporation (ESDC), we received ESDC’s Grant Disbursement Agreement with AMD, the 
company’s Empire Zone application and some correspondence. None of the documents 
Case Studies:  Eight Major High-Tech Deals
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy65
cover the early time period during which AMD was considering where to locate the 
facility. Nor do any of them shed any light on the role of subsidies—significant or not— 
in AMD’s choice of location. 
The Grant Disbursement Agreement provides for a grant of up to $650 million for 
a facility with expected total project costs of $3.2 billion (including $2.6 billion for 
machinery and equipment), with a completion date at the end of 2014. A minimum of 
1,205 new full-time employees were expected to be hired by January 2014, and retained 
each year through 2021. No wage requirements are stated. The agreement puts the net 
fiscal benefit to the state government at about $145 million, and the economic benefit to 
the state is estimated at about $1.47 billion. 
A December 3, [2007] letter from the ESDC to the Saratoga County Empire Zone 
Administrative Board gives the board permission to grant the AMD project Empire Zone 
benefits as a “regionally significant” manufacturing project even though it is not located 
within the boundaries of a zone. Such non-contiguous expansions of Empire Zones away 
from distressed areas have been a recurring source of controversy in New York State. 
Conclusions
Local officials in the Capital Region would argue that this situation shows the virtue of 
patience, especially when reeling in a big fish. It took three years after the deal went 
public (after an unknown length of site location and recruitment time prior to that)—and 
a transformation of the company involved—but it appears that a chip fab is indeed going 
to come into existence in Saratoga County. However, neither state nor local officials have 
satisfied critics who say that spending $1 million per job is too high a cost for the benefit 
involved.  
This is an especially salient criticism for a chip fab, which does not usually have a large 
accompanying research and development staff, etc. Chip fabs are extremely automated 
facilities. Like many high-technology facilities, chip fabs typically display a wage-
distribution curve shaped like a dumbbell. Unlike, say, an auto factory where the wage 
curve would look like a bell curve (a few low-wage jobs, lots of middle-income jobs, and 
a few highly-paid management jobs), a high-tech “dumbbell” wage profile includes a 
substantial number of low-wage jobs (such as lab technicians in clean rooms), relatively 
few middle-income workers, and a substantial number of well-paid engineering and 
managerial positions. None of the documents reviewed for this case study provided 
information on the plant's projected wage distribution. 
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Ohio Case Study:  Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc. (West Chester)
Biotech company Amylin Pharmaceuticals initially received modest incentives to 
open a manufacturing facility in Ohio for its Byetta synthetic insulin and later got a 
much bigger subsidy package when it decided on a major expansion of the plant.  
 
The eagerness of two administrations to land the investment probably led the state 
to offer too much to a company with a single product that was highly motivated to 
choose the site because of its proximity to a critical manufacturing and technology 
partner.  
 
The emergence of another competitive product increases the risks for the project.
The Company
San Diego-based Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc. is a publicly traded biotech company with 
about $840 million in annual revenue. 
Amylin is a relative rarity in the world of biotechnology: It’s a company with a marketable 
drug. There are over 1,450 companies in the Biotechnology Industry Organization, yet 
less than a tenth have Food and Drug Administration-approved products. Indeed, there 
have been just 200 FDA-approved products from the entire biotech industry over its 
30-plus-year history, and most of the industry’s $75 billion in sales in 2007 came from 
just a handful of industry giants like Amgen, Genentech, and Genzyme. 
Founded in 1987 to research treatments for diabetes, Amylin with its 1,800 employees 
is essentially a one-drug firm. The FDA approved Byetta (exenatide) in April 2005. It is 
an injectable synthetic version of a naturally-occurring protein that promotes insulin 
production in people with type 2 diabetes. 
However, the drug was only approved as adjunct (additional) therapy for patients whose 
blood sugar isn’t controlled with existing oral medications like metformin, and it was 
cautiously greeted in the medical literature. A July 2007 review in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association concluded that while the new class of medicines that 
included Byetta had “modest efficacy and a favorable weight change profile . . . continued 
evaluation in longer-term studies and in clinical practice are required to determine the 
role of this new class among current pharmacotherapies for type 2 diabetes.”103  
Sales growth quickly hit a plateau. In the first half of 2009, Byetta accounted for $333 
million or 83 percent of company revenue, virtually unchanged from a year earlier. The 
company’s sales effort—it jointly marketed the drug with Eli Lilly—was also set back 
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when a rival product in its class entered the market. Merck’s Januvia (sitagliptin) is a small 
molecule drug, which has the advantage of being orally administered. It received FDA 
approval as a primary therapy for type 2 diabetes in October 2006.
Despite having a marketable drug, the company still lost $42 million on $403 million in 
sales in the first six months of 2009. That compared with a loss of $84 million on $379 
million in sales in the first half of 2008.
Amylin has long understood that its first-mover advantage in this new class of medicines 
wouldn’t last long. As early as 2000, it had begun reengineering the protein so it would 
stay in the blood stream longer. This would be a significant improvement for a medication 
that had to be taken intravenously every day. It conducted this research through a 
partnership with Alkermes, a Cambridge, Massachusetts-based firm that has proprietary 
technology for developing long-acting versions of protein-based biologics. Alkermes’ sole 
commercial manufacturing facility is in Wilmington, Ohio (which is just 40 miles from 
West Chester). 
In July 2009, Amylin submitted a new drug application to the FDA for its once-weekly 
version of Byetta. While there are always some regulatory uncertainties at this stage 
of the drug approval process, because the two drugs are very similar, approval is likely 
within a year. The company completed an expansion of manufacturing and distribution 
capacity at its West Chester, Ohio site in mid-2008 in order to hit the ground running 
when FDA approval for Long-Acting Byetta is secured.
The Story as Reported by News Media
Amylin’s foray into Ohio took place in two stages. In late 2005, the company announced 
it would locate a new manufacturing facility with 52 jobs in West Chester, Ohio. “Butler 
County beat out northern Kentucky and three other states,” the local paper chirped in 
announcing the deal, which involved $3 million in state and local incentives, including 
an 8-year, 75 percent personal and tangible property tax abatement for the $70 million 
investment.104
Reporters in Amylin’s hometown of San Diego took note. The decision to begin 
manufacturing in Ohio was “about having greater control over the product and being 
close to a partner in the complicated manufacturing process,” Amylin chief financial 
officer Mark Foletta told the San Diego Union-Tribune. However, he did add that “the tax 
breaks certainly didn’t hurt.”105 An Amylin press release issued a week later confirmed 
that “this new facility is strategically located near our technology partner Alkermes, which 
will facilitate technology transfer and allow for additional support as we move forward,” 
chief executive officer Ginger L. Graham said. 
The first public inkling that Amylin planned a major expansion at its new site came from 
newly-elected Ohio Gov. Ted Strickland, who mentioned during a speech at Dayton’s 
Sinclair Community College in late March 2007 that a $400 million investment by “a 
major pharmaceutical company” may be coming to Ohio. He declined to name the 
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company. When reporters contacted Amylin because it was the likely prospect, a company 
spokeswoman confirmed the company was looking to expand but “we have a lot of 
different options, and we’re talking to a lot of people.”106
The southern Ohio press did not follow up on that comment or publish any reports 
that a bidding war was underway. Nor was there press coverage in other cities or states 
suggesting other communities were being asked to bid for the expansion. 
On May 3, 2007, the Cincinnati Enquirer announced in a front page story that Amylin 
planned to add 500 jobs at its West Chester facility.107 There was no mention of tax 
incentives in the prominently placed if relatively brief article. It wasn’t until six months 
later, on Nov. 6, the day after the dedication ceremony at the expanded facility, that the 
press reported the state provided $46 million in tax breaks for Amylin. The project “was 
no slam dunk. This was a real competition” involving several states in the Southwest, Lt. 
Gov. Lee Fisher told the Enquirer.108
Details from the Public Documents
The state subsidy package included far more than tax breaks and totaled more than twice 
the $46 million reported at the dedication event. Combined with several kinds of local 
incentives, state records indicate that the total subsidy package came to $117 million. 
Here is the sequence of events based upon state files. 
Amylin contacted Ohio officials sometime in late 2005 about locating its first 
manufacturing facility in the state. Lt. Gov Bruce Johnson, in his last year of office along 
with Gov. Bob Taft, took the lead. On Nov. 4, 2005, Ohio offered the company $2.4 million 
in various incentives as part of Amylin’s plan to purchase an existing 151,200-square-foot 
plant in the southern corner of the state that would house 52 manufacturing jobs. Amylin 
estimated its investment in West Chester would total between $70 and $84 million. 
Johnson’s letter noted the state’s commitment was based on the understanding that 
“Amylin is also considering an alternative location in northern Kentucky.”109  
Just three weeks later, Johnson sent a second letter to Scott Tarney of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP in Columbus, which was operating as one of the company’s 
site location consultants. The revised incentive package now had an estimated value of 
over $3 million.110
The following month, the Butler County Commissioners voted 3-0 to designate an 
enterprise zone for Amylin and granted the firm an eight-year, 75 percent abatement on 
all real and personal tangible property taxes on its investment. The average wage of the 
jobs would be $52,700 the ordinance noted, with a total annual payroll of $2.7 million. 
The January 18, 2006 commitment letter from Amylin’s corporate controller Laura Clague 
to Johnson confirmed the “understanding of our proposed project, as follows: $70 million 
investment in a pharmaceuticals manufacturing facility; 52 new jobs.” This commitment 
letter made no mention of competition from northern Kentucky.111
Case Studies:  Eight Major High-Tech Deals
Growing Pennsylvania’s High-Tech Economy69
Nine months later, the company began sending signals to state officials that bigger plans 
were afoot. On Oct. 1, 2006, Amylin applied for $150,000 from Ohio’s Investment in 
Training Program to supplement 50 percent of its job training costs at its factory. Three 
weeks later John Pratt, the facility’s general manager, complained the company was 
“having a little difficulty” filling its production jobs.112 
That set the stage for the company’s major presentation to the Ohio Department of 
Development on Oct. 27, 2006. Pratt, Diana Reed, a senior public affairs executive from 
San Diego, and Tarney from PricewaterhouseCoopers told the state that the firm was 
considering a major expansion at its West Chester site with the potential for 561 jobs 
and an investment of $410 million. But the company said it was also looking at “several 
Southwestern states.”113
Therefore, the company needed assistance, which it opportunistically listed as its number 
one location criteria. “We need to explore all existing programs available in Ohio as well 
as explore any potential creative opportunity,” they said. Other factors that would weigh 
on the decision included real estate costs, labor market conditions, operating costs, 
utility services and costs and the availability of a trained work force. (These business 
basics, which far outweigh taxes as cost factors, are normally the dominant determinants 
for locating expansions and relocations.) 
Two weeks later, Lt. Gov. Johnson sent Ginger Graham, the chief executive of Amylin, a 
letter pledging $16.8 million in state tax breaks and incentives if the company would 
invest another $410 million in Ohio.114 (The Taft administration was term limited, so Taft 
and Johnson were by now lame ducks, Ted Strickland and Lee Fisher having been elected 
governor and lieutenant governor, respectively.) On Dec. 6, 2006, Johnson upped his offer 
to Amylin to $73 million in state incentives. “This preliminary commitment of assistance 
is based on the assumption the company would invest $410 million, create 500 new jobs, 
retain the 52 old jobs, and that “the State of Ohio is in competition with undisclosed sites 
in the Southwest United States for this project,” he wrote.115 
Governor-elect Strickland and Lt. Gov.-elect Fisher didn’t question the escalating price 
tag. “Your proposed expansion is a very high priority for us,” Strickland wrote to Amylin 
CEO Ginger L. Graham on December 14; he designated Fisher as the chief contact for the 
state. The package was clearly a bi-partisan affair. In late January, Ohio dignitaries toured 
Amylin’s West Chester facility. The state brought along U.S. Rep. John Boehner, the local 
Congressman (who happens to reside in West Chester), while CEO Graham came from San 
Diego for the event.
The economically depressed state was an easy mark for Amylin’s advocates. The company 
hired Dinsmore & Shohl, a white shoe corporate law firm in Cincinnati, to represent 
it in negotiations. Richard Tranter, a Dinsmore partner, emailed state officials in early 
February asking for “the entire list of incentives that can be offered by the Department 
of Development,” including those not already offered. “Indicate why Amylin has not been 
able to access them. Please list the statutory or administrative barriers,” he wrote.
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By the time Graham, bumped up to chairman of the board, and her successor as CEO, Dan 
Bradbury, visited West Chester in late February, Lt. Gov. Fisher was ready with another 
offer. The state would come up with $30 million in loans and grants to help finance the 
expansion, and the incentive package was increased to $98 million with “significant 
investments in workforce recruitment and development.”116 
The local part of the offer came two days later. The Butler County Commissioners 
announced: $26 million in enterprise zone tax abatements (100 percent for 10 years 
for up to $100 million in construction); $6.5 million in creative lease financing with the 
Port Authority; $1.5 million in highway improvements; $1.4 million in water and sewer 
improvements; and $220,000 for fiber optic access. Coupled with the state offer, the 
package was now up to $117 million. “The state of Ohio is in competition with two 
unnamed states for Amylin’s proposed project,” the County letter dutifully repeated.117
Less than two weeks later, Lt. Gov. Fisher pressed Bradbury and his chief financial officer, 
Mark Foletta, for a definitive answer while they were visiting Columbus to discuss details 
of the expansion. He wanted the governor to be able to announce it at his state-of-the-
state address a few days later. The morning of the address, Bradbury responded with 
a long email saying “we are continuing with our plans to potentially make substantial 
additional investments in Ohio” but “we have certain business issues to work through, 
including detailed work plans and incentive and financing structures.” He did allow 
Strickland to say that “Amylin is planning to increase the scope of its investment in Ohio.” 
But without a firm commitment, the governor left it out of his speech.
There’s little evidence that Amylin was looking anywhere else. Indeed, on March 23, a 
local reporter who routinely checked property transactions in the county discovered that 
Amylin had purchased a large site next to its existing plant. After Gov. Strickland gave his 
speech at Sinclair Community College less than a week later (the first public hint of the 
expansion), the Dayton Daily News reported the governor said Arizona was no longer 
competing for the project.118 On the other hand, the Cincinnati Enquirer’s story on the 
same event quoted a company spokeswoman saying “we have a lot of different options, 
and we’re talking to a lot of people.”119
The lack of finality helped Amylin escalate its demands. In early May, CFO Foletta told 
Fisher that Amylin was prepared to accept the state offer, but it wanted all the job 
training and site preparation grants severed from any equity investment requirements 
and it wanted work to begin on the $26.5 million in low-interest loans for construction.120 
The state accepted. The next day, the press reported the company’s planned expansion.121 
The local incentive package wasn’t voted on by Butler County for another six months, 
even though construction was well underway. The company received a 10-year, 75 
percent abatement. The ordinance did have a clawback provision, however: if the 
company fails to reach 75 percent of the 450 projected new jobs over any three-year 
period, it will trigger a requirement that the company pay its property taxes in full for 
that period.
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In April 2008, as the new plant neared completion, Amylin nailed down the final piece 
of its incentive package. It wanted the state to float a $26.5 million bond issue to 
finance machinery and equipment for the new distribution center.122  The loan the state 
assembled included $15.3 million from its Research and Development Investment Loan 
fund, even though there was no indication that Amylin planned to carry out new product 
R&D at the site. The contract called for the company to spend at least 15 percent of the 
money on R&D-related equipment.
Conclusion: A Big Subsidy for a Risky Deal, Based Upon an Unverified Competition
It’s easy to understand why state and local officials were excited about the prospect of 
landing a high-tech biotech firm for economically depressed Ohio. But their bi-partisan 
desperation prevented them from questioning Amylin’s claim of competing locations. 
That Amylin’s critical manufacturing and technology partner Alkermes was located just 40 
miles away in Wilmington certainly made southern Ohio a compelling site, if not the most 
competitive location, for the plant. The failure of the local press to investigate the alleged 
bidding war made it easier for the company to get the state to up the ante.
The state’s desperation also apparently prevented officials from questioning why the 
cash-strapped company openly insisted on a soup-to-nuts package of every available kind 
of subsidy. Though they won the deal, Ohio and Butler County agreed to place a lot of 
taxpayer eggs in an inherently risky basket. The Ohio jobs are almost entirely dependent 
on the fate of a single product. In November 2008, Amylin announced a 25 percent 
reduction in its San Diego workforce as it scaled back R&D activities. With no other 
product to fall back on, any stumble in the rollout of Long-Acting Byetta could put both 
the taxpayers’ investment and the region’s 400-plus jobs at risk.
Even as this is written, new storm clouds are appearing on the horizon. On July 31, 2009, 
the FDA announced its approval of a third competitor in this new class of drugs that 
stimulate insulin production in diabetics. Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Onglyza (saxagliptin), 
like Merck’s new Januvia, is an oral medication.  After Amylin’s once-a-week injectable is 
approved, it will be up against two deep-pocketed, Big Pharma rivals.
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Maryland Case Study:  Battelle Memorial Institute (Aberdeen)
Battelle, a non-profit research and development corporation, received multiple 
subsidies for a facility that included new and consolidated jobs in Harford County, 
Maryland. Over time, the deal shrank in dollar value and projected job creation, 
and the company has barely managed to sustain a headcount required for a 
forgivable loan. There is no indication that Maryland’s generosity was a response to 
any threats from Battelle that it might leave the state. And the subsidies provided 
were not specifically intended for high technology firms; they were generic 
incentives such as property tax abatements and loan assistance available to many 
kinds of employers.
The Company
The Battelle Memorial Institute is a leading independent research and development 
organization. Founded in the 1920s and headquartered in Columbus, Ohio, Battelle has 
an annual budget of about $4 billion and a workforce of about 20,000. It is organized as a 
non-profit corporation. 
The Story as Reported in the News Media
In September 1999 Battelle announced plans to open a $40 million operating center near 
Aberdeen, Maryland that it said would bring as many as 300 scientific and technical jobs 
to Harford County by 2003. (The county comprises the northeast part of metropolitan 
Baltimore.) Battelle’s new Eastern Regional Technology Operation Center was to be 
located in the county’s Higher Education and Applied Technology (HEAT) Center. Battelle 
was already active in the area at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, a U.S. Army weapons 
testing facility that occupies a peninsula in the Chesapeake Bay.123 At a press conference 
announcing the plan, then-Gov. Parris N. Glendening said: “As we all know, the economy 
of the future is based on knowledge. A private company like Battelle would not be here, 
would not be expanding here, except for Aberdeen Proving Ground.”124
The deal received no more media coverage until June 2001, when Battelle made a new 
announcement about opening a facility on 30.5 acres of land in the HEAT center. However, 
the facility was now valued at only half as much as originally announced: $20 million. 
The land, to be purchased from the Maryland Transportation Authority for the favorable 
price of $2.1 million, was located in an enterprise zone. A Battelle spokesperson said 
that, in addition to zone tax breaks, the organization expected to receive training and 
recruitment subsidies.125 The Baltimore Sun later reported that Battelle would receive 
grants and loans of $566,000 and tax credits of about $250,000 for the facility.126 
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Battelle’s 80,000-square-foot Eastern Science and Technology Center officially opened in 
March 2003 with a staff of about 200 scientists and researchers.127 
Details from State and County Documents
According to county and state documents we obtained under the state’s Public 
Information Act, discussions between Battelle and Harford County apparently began in 
early 1999, but they involved a different proposed facility and deal structure. On April 
21 of that year, Harford County Executive James M. Harkins wrote to Warren C. Mullins, 
Battelle’s Vice President of Business Development, proposing that Battelle use space 
in the HEAT Center—a business park owned by the Maryland Transportation Authority 
(MdTA)—for its planned National Toxicological Laboratory. “We are prepared to broker 
a more detailed discussion of a build-to-suit development project for Battelle,” Harkins 
wrote, “with the Maryland Economic Development Corporation (MEDCO) acting as the 
project developer.” 
J. Thomas Sadowski, the county’s Director of Economic Development, followed up 
with a letter to Mullins on April 28 in which he referred to a previous conversation and 
proposed subsidy assistance from Harford County, the State of Maryland Department 
of Business and Economic Development (DBED) and MEDCO. The county agreed to 
broker negotiations with MdTA for land at the HEAT Center and with MEDCO for the 
development, construction and leasing of the proposed facility. The offered package 
included:
Loan convertible to grant	
Low-interest loan	
Enterprise Zone Tax Credits (including an estimated $669,803 in real property tax 	
credits in years 1-10 and $37,5000 in income tax credits in year one
Maryland Job Creation Tax Credits worth an estimated $90,000	
Workforce Development Assistance (possibly including a $50,000 grant)	
Bond financing for MEDCO’s role as developer and construction agent	
Fast track processing of development plans and permits	
While these negotiations were taking place, Battelle was not tax-exempt. It had given up 
that status a quarter-century earlier in a legal dispute over whether it was living up to its 
philanthropic commitments. In 2002 Battelle regained tax-exempt standing (retroactive 
to May 2001). This rendered moot the provisions in the Maryland deal relating to state 
corporate income taxes. Battelle, however, remained subject to local property taxes.
On June 8, Sadowski followed up a meeting with Thomas M. Pounds, Battelle’s Vice 
President for Corporate Strategy and Planning, with a letter accompanied by a project 
outline. The proposed facility had now become a biomedical lab (with a cost of $33.6 
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million), an electronic engineering R&D facility ($3.3 million) and administrative offices 
($1.1 million) along with $5.5 million in equipment purchases. These would create 250 
new jobs and retain 50 existing ones at an average annual salary of $55,000.
On July 21, Richard C. Mike Lewin, Secretary of DBED, sent a letter to Battelle’s chief 
executive (who had apparently met with DBED staffers at Battelle’s headquarters in 
Columbus). He wrote that “the State of Maryland and Harford County can provide a 
business such as yours with phenomenal opportunities as we enter the 21st century.” In 
addition to having MEDCO build the facilities for Battelle, Lewin said the agency would 
consider providing loans of up to $5 million and would provide $300,000 in state training 
funds. This would be in addition to up to $450,000 in Maryland Job Creation Tax Credits. 
After showing the money on the table, Lewin described the other advantages of the site, 
including the concentration of federal research in the area and the high education level of 
Maryland’s workforce. Along with the letter, Lewin sent a nine-page document describing 
the incentives in more detail. 
The state files we received do not include any written replies from Battelle to these 
overtures, but they do include a resolution passed by Battelle's board of trustees on 
August 10, 2000 authorizing the deal. However, Battelle officials decided to use the HEAT 
Center land for a Technology Center and to build and own the facility itself rather than 
having MEDCO act as developer and landlord. 
In a November 8, 2000 letter of intent to MdTA to purchase eight parcels of land at 
the HEAT Center and to spend $20 million building the Technology Center, Battelle 
Vice President-Government Business Services Stephen R. Heimann gave 15 conditions. 
They included a $900,000 payment from DBED’s “Sunny Day Fund” and continuation of 
existing property tax abatements. In a second letter, Heimann told DBED and the County 
Executive of Battelle’s plan and committed to employing 150 people at the site, adding 
that “we fully anticipate the creation of a substantial number of jobs in excess of this 
target.”
On March 19, 2001, DBED Secretary David Iannucci and the County’s Sadowski responded 
in a letter to Battelle CEO Douglas Olesen. On the assumption that Battelle would spend 
$20 million on the new facility—relocating 89 employees from the company’s existing 
Maryland facility and hiring an additional 166 full-time employees128 by the end of 2005—
DBED committed to the following: a workforce grant of up to $166,000 and an eight-year 
unsecured loan of $400,000 at 3 percent, the principal and interest on which would be 
forgiven if the company had at least 225 full-time employees in Harford County by the 
end of 2005 and retained them through the end of 2008. A partial loan forgiveness would 
be allowed for employment of at least 200 people. 
The letter listed other possible incentives, including state Job Creation Tax Credits worth 
up to $249,000; Enterprise Zone Tax Credits (including real property credits worth an 
estimated $1.5 million and income tax credits); and various county incentives. Olesen 
accepted the terms by countersigning the letter on April 20, 2001.
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On June 20, the state formally transferred ownership of the HEAT Center parcel to 
Battelle for $2.135 million. On October 1, DBED Secretary Iannucci sent a letter to Olesen 
formally offering the $400,000 loan. A loan agreement dated February 11, 2002 was 
signed by the parties, and a check was sent on February 14. The agreement said that the 
loan was made pursuant to the Maryland Economic Development Assistance Authority 
and Fund. 
On December 19, 2001 Harford County wrote to Olesen offering up to $40,000 in 
matching technical training grant funds. In March 2003 Battelle signed an agreement with 
DBED under which it would receive up to $91,365 in funds under the Maryland Industrial 
Training Program. The agreement required Battelle to reach 166 full-time, permanent 
employees by the end of 2005 and maintain that level for two years. 
In January 2004 Battelle applied for $20 million in industrial development revenue bonds 
to be issued by Harford County. These so-called “private activity bonds” typically lower 
the cost of private construction because they are issued by a public agency and therefore 
the interest paid on them is tax-free to investors. The interest rate savings are very 
substantial, typically about one fourth lower (e.g., six percent instead of eight percent) 
compared to taxable commercial bonds. The following month Harford County approved 
up to $22 million in such financing; however, according to an Official Statement dated 
April 2004 we obtained from Munistatements, the actual bond issue was set at $17.8 
million. 
Before long, Battelle was planning an expansion of its HEAT Center facility. It arranged to 
purchase additional land from the Maryland Transportation Authority for $1.65 million. 
On April 19, 2006 Harford County and DBED wrote to the new CEO of Battelle, Carl Kohrt, 
offering a state loan of $400,000, forgivable if the company’s workforce increased to at 
least 270 full-timers; a state workforce grant of up to $240,000; enterprise zone property 
tax credits; county training assistance; reduced utility rates from BG&E; and other 
incentives. In June 2006 the state approved the $400,000 loan. 
Battelle has barely sustained the 225-job target in its original deal: in a January 21, 2008 
letter to Harford County, it reported 231 jobs at the end of 2007 (down from 272 at the 
end of 2006, which in turn was down from 383 at the end of 2005). 
Conclusion
State and county officials did not have to try very hard to lure Battelle, since the company 
already had operations in the area, and its initial plan for a toxicological lab fit well with 
the work already being done by Battelle and others at the nearby Aberdeen facility. 
Nonetheless, it appears that the state and the county rushed to offer a subsidy package 
to Battelle that included property tax exemptions, loan-interest loans, training grants and 
tax credits. Initially, the state was also offering to serve as the developer and landlord to 
Battelle. Although public records shed no light on why, Battelle rejected that lease option 
in favor of building and owning the facility itself, with some financial help from the state. 
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The records also give no indication that the state was aware that Battelle regained its tax-
exempt status in 2002, which mooted some of the tax incentives being offered. 
Battelle purchased the land at a low price and also received a training grant and a low-
interest loan that was forgivable if the company meets modest job-creation criteria. It 
also got low-interest industrial revenue bonds through the County. When Battelle decided 
to expand, it again received land at a favorable price and was offered another package of 
tax holidays, a loan, and training grants. 
Battelle at first surpassed its job-creation goals by a wide margin but subsequently 
reduced its employment sharply, barely remaining in adherence to the loan agreement. 
Finally, the deal for Battelle did not hinge on Maryland’s targeted subsidy programs for 
high-tech industries. The abatements, loans, grants and low-cost financing described 
above are typically available to a wide range of companies. 
New Jersey Case Study:  Nycomed (formerly Altana) (Florham Park)
When German drug company Altana announced in 2001 the launch of a new 
product line in the U.S. market, it chose Florham Park, New Jersey and predicted 
more than 1,000 jobs within five years. 
However, despite that rosy forecast, public records reveal that the New Jersey 
Economic Development Authority (NJEDA) imposed only the state’s minimum 
requirement—75 jobs—for the company to remain eligible for the most lucrative 
economic development subsidy, a personal income tax rebate. The project’s 
employment peaked at around 550 and later fell to fewer than 100 jobs. 
The company apparently remained in technical compliance with the job 
requirement, enabling it to keep all of the lucrative rebates derived from its 
employees’ paychecks, including from workers who were later laid off. 
The Company
The deal originally involved the U.S. pharmaceutical business of Altana AG, a German 
specialty chemicals company that in 2008 had revenues of about $2 billion. In 2007 that 
business, Altana Pharma, was taken over by Nycomed, a privately held pharmaceutical 
group with headquarters in Zurich, Switzerland. Nycomed had global revenues of about 
$4.8 billion in 2008.  
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Project Summary from News Media Reports
In September 2001 the German pharmaceutical giant Altana AG announced a new U.S. 
operation called Altana Pharma to market pulmonary and gastrointestinal medications 
developed by the parent company.129 The company located its marketing and product 
development operations in Florham Park, New Jersey, which would also be the site of 
some other company functions. When the operation opened in September 2002 Altana 
predicted that the payroll would exceed 1,000 within five years, but it never came close 
to that figure, peaking at about 550 positions.130 
In October 2006, the company announced that it would shut its sales and marketing 
operations in Florham Park, eliminating about 350 of those jobs, while the other 
functions would remain at that location.131 This occurred shortly after the parent company 
was sold to the Swiss group Nycomed. 
After the announcement of the partial closure, the non-profit watchdog group New Jersey 
Policy Perspective issued a press release noting that Altana had received grants totaling 
nearly $500,000 from the state’s Business Employment Incentive Program (BEIP, a payroll 
tax rebate). The organization called on the company to repay the subsidy, stating that 
“New Jersey taxpayers shouldn’t have to support payoffs for layoffs.”132 It appears that the 
state did not immediately try to claw back the funds. 
In addition to BEIP payments for the Florham Park site, Altana had also been receiving 
BEIP payments for a site in Parsippany-Troy Hills. And while workers were laid-off in 
Florham Park, BEIP dollars continued to flow to Altana based on payroll in Parsippany. 
That was allowed because the Altana BEIP grants predated 2004 reforms to the BEIP 
program that made it more accountable by requiring the state to look at a BEIP 
company’s employment statewide when determining if clawbacks will be used.133 As of 
October 2009, NJEDA records indicate that the only active BEIP site for Nycomed (the 
successor company) is the former Altana site in Parsippany-Troy Hills and that it has 
received $1.2 million in BEIP payments.  
Details from State Records
Despite the public announcement of 1,000 projected jobs, Altana’s application to the 
New Jersey Economic Development Authority dated November 13, 2000 included a 
projection that it would hire only 122 new employees in New Jersey during the first year 
at an average annual salary of $97,870. In an agreement signed in 2003 between Altana 
and the EDA, the company projected that it would create 174 jobs over two years; the 
state in turn promised a BEIP grant equal to 65 percent of the state personal income 
taxes withheld by the company from the employees’ paychecks. The “minimum eligibility 
threshold” to sustain the BEIP tax diversion was set at only 75 jobs, the state minimum. 
In 2008, after Altana was taken over by Nycomed, the company filed a change-of-name 
form with the NJEDA. On March 10 the NJEDA responded with a letter saying that it 
appeared that the company was no longer in compliance with the “minimum eligibility 
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threshold” and asked for a repayment of about $348,000 in grant proceeds for 2006. The 
company responded that it was technically still in compliance since it had 82 employees 
at the end of the year, after apparently engaging in further downsizing beyond what it 
had announced in October 2006. The NJEDA apparently accepted the company’s position. 
Conclusion: Did a Lucrative Tax Rebate Attract Rootless Jobs? 
Given the project’s ultimate failure to grow stable jobs and the company’s narrow 
compliance with a minimum job requirement, it appears that Altana may have been more 
interested in New Jersey’s lucrative BEIP rebates of personal income taxes than it was in 
the state’s labor force, industry linkages, or other business assets.  
BEIP grants, while costly, are not a particularly good tool for growing high-tech jobs 
and are not specifically targeted to them. Because the job creation requirements in BEIP 
were low (they have since been lowered to 10 for high-tech companies), the company 
apparently remained technically in compliance—and therefore eligible to keep past tax 
rebates derived from former employees’ paychecks—even after laying off most of its peak 
workforce, employing only eight percent as many people as it first projected.
West Virginia Case Study:  Kureha (Belle)
West Virginia landed a capital-intensive plant of the Japanese firm Kureha that will 
make bottling plastic; it is located next to a longstanding DuPont factory that will 
feed it raw materials. Economic development subsidies were not cited by public 
officials at the time of the announcement and there were no known competing 
locations; proximity to the feeder plant appears to have been key, almost an act of 
chemical engineering historical reverence according to a company statement after 
construction began. 
The surrounding labor market also has many skilled dislocated chemical-plant 
operators. The project will likely qualify for two as-of-right tax credits, one of 
which is targeted to high technology. It also received a modest amount of technical 
assistance and training aid and benefited from the expansion of an existing free 
trade zone, but none of these latter subsidies is particular to high technology.
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The Company
Kureha Corporation is a Japanese company that produces specialty plastics, food 
packaging, agrochemicals, and pharmaceuticals. It has annual revenues of about $1 
billion. 
Project Summary from News Media Reports
In December 2007, Kureha announced it would invest more than $100 million in a new 
plant in Belle, West Virginia.134 Expected to create about 50 new jobs, it would produce 
a high-performance polymer, polyglycolic acid (PGA), used for bottling carbonated 
soft drinks and beer and valued for its greater strength and resulting economy of use.  
Production at the Kureha plant is projected to begin in 2010.
The announcement was hailed by West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin and U.S. Senator 
Jay Rockefeller, among others.135 The officials had visited the company during two 
trade missions to Japan, and the company cited the presence of many other Japanese 
manufacturers in the state as a positive. There were no references to economic 
development subsidies in the announcement of the plant or the immediate reactions by 
public officials. 
Proximity to a key input appears to be the decisive site location advantage: the Kureha 
project site is adjacent to a DuPont chemical plant which will supply it raw material. 
The DuPont operation, where nylon was first produced, had experienced waves of 
downsizing and layoffs during the past two decades. Interviewed for the Spring 
2008 groundbreaking, Kureha CEO Takao Iwasaki said of the location: “There is also 
a sentimental reason. Belle is the birthplace of nylon. This is almost holy ground for 
chemical engineers. And we are chemical engineers.”136 
In early 2008 the Charleston Area Alliance announced that it was providing free space in 
its business incubator for an eight-member design and engineering team from Kureha 
working on the new plant. Elizabeth Gershon, executive vice president of Kureha America 
Inc., told a reporter: “We are gratified by the enthusiastic reception we have received 
by government officials, business leaders and economic development organizations, 
including the Charleston Area Alliance.”137
Sen. Rockefeller was among the public officials who attended the official groundbreaking 
for the site in April 2008; he issued a press release noting that he and Gov. Manchin were 
part of a trade mission that had visited Kureha’s Japanese headquarters in 2005. An April 
8, 2008 article in the Charleston Gazette reported that the recruitment efforts dated back 
to a 2003 state-led trade mission.138
In July 2008 the West Virginia Economic Development Authority endorsed a revision of 
the boundaries of an existing foreign trade zone at DuPont’s Belle plant to include the 
new Kureha facility, allowing it to import materials and then export finished products free 
of tariffs. 
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It was not until April 2009 that construction actually began at the Kureha site, but 
operations are expected to begin in mid-2010, with a staff of 50, including 10 Japanese 
and 40 American. 
Details from Public Records
In the only such response Good Jobs First has ever received from a state government, the 
West Virginia Development Office cited state code in claiming that correspondence and 
other records relating to the negotiation of business assistance are exempt from public 
disclosure. However, Steve Spence of the agency orally informed us that Kureha was 
going to receive:
Governor’s Guaranteed Workforce Training Funds worth $2,000 per job 	
Economic Opportunity Tax Credits worth 20 percent of the value of the investment 	
spread over 10 years. (If the company invested $100 million, that would create a tax 
credit entitlement of $20 million, or $2 million a year for 10 years.) Spence stated 
that the company would probably be unable to use the full value of the credits 
because its tax liability would not reach that level. 
The Charleston Area Alliance confirmed to us that it provided free office space for 
Kureha. It also provided technical assistance, including help orienting Kureha’s Japanese 
employees to the area and facilitating a series of meetings between the company and the 
West Virginia State Community and Technical College to discuss the school’s program for 
chemical operators. 
Conclusion
West Virginia scored a rare high-tech investment when this Japanese company decided 
to open a specialty plastics operation. It appears that proximity to a raw materials source 
was key to the siting decision and that subsidies did not play a role. 
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Policy Recommendations
Based upon our findings, we offer the following policy recommendations. While these 
points center on Pennsylvania, they certainly apply as well in varying degrees to the six 
other states studied here. 
1. First, Do No More Harm to the Tax Code
The quantitative evidence based on rates of return and long-term job-creation is 
overwhelming: Pennsylvania’s tax rates and existing regimen of incentives are clearly 
not an issue compared to those of neighboring states. As outlined below, the state has 
numerous better ways to invest economic development resources than granting costly 
tax-break packages to individual companies, or broadly reducing corporate tax rates. And 
state tax policy should not be confused with federal trade policy. 
2. Continue Efforts to Better Integrate Workforce and Economic Development
In recent years, Pennsylvania has become a national leader in the effort to better connect 
workforce development to economic development. It has done this by focusing its 
training investments on the skill gaps of regional industries that pay well and in which 
Pennsylvania has actual or potential economic advantages.139 Many of Pennsylvania’s 
Industry Partnerships are in high-technology, including the biomedical industry, 
information technology, plastics, powdered metals, and energy.140 
With investments of $20 million per year starting in 2005-06, but slashed to $9.2 million 
in the state’s 2009-10 budget, Pennsylvania has seed-funded over 70 sector-specific 
training consortia—Industry Partnerships—to identify and meet common training needs. 
These Industry Partnerships have brought some 6,300 business together (about $3,000 
per company per year) and trained some 73,000 workers. 
Pennsylvania is, in essence, modeling how states can invest in “public goods for the 21st 
century” by enhancing the human capital infrastructure of technology industries. This is a 
more appropriate role for government than large subsidies to individual companies and a 
vital policy innovation given the winds of global competition. 
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Pennsylvania should commit long-term to its Industry Partnership strategy to “grow its 
own” key industries. It should also invest in additional evaluation efforts to fine tune the 
strategy and help Industry Partnership coordinators maximize their impact on cluster 
competitiveness and job opportunity.  
3. Build on “Occupational Cluster” Advantages That Fuel Innovation
To complement its existing efforts to strengthen various industrial “clusters” (i.e., 
targeted industries), Pennsylvania should also build upon its occupational clusters—its 
existing high concentrations of workers in occupations that drive the innovation 
economy, such as engineering and biomedical occupations. Even as manufacturing 
employment in the Pittsburgh region has declined, for example, the region has retained 
great strength in specialized engineering occupations that support the steel and nuclear 
industries. 
There is nothing automatic about the retention of a region’s high-wage occupational 
advantages for the long term. But with careful nurturing, the continuing asset of powerful 
higher education engineering institutions, and the internet making it increasingly 
possible for innovation workers to work at a physical distance from their clients, 
investing in occupational clusters may well suit metro areas such as Pittsburgh, with its 
moderate costs and strong quality of life. 
Together with our other policy recommendation of investing more in small, local 
and young businesses, investing in occupational clusters is a pro-dynamism, pro-
entrepreneurial strategy. And since human capital is comparatively immobile, in the event 
of a workplace closure or mass layoff, it reduces taxpayer risk by reducing the chance that 
investments will be lost from the state. It is the opposite of putting “a lot of eggs in a few 
corporate baskets.” 
4. Grow Your Own (Existing) Employers Rather than Recruit from Other States
Recruiting companies from other states is a comparatively costly way to “create” jobs; it 
causes ill will among the states that see their jobs being “pirated,” and may even provoke 
them to retaliate. Interstate movement of jobs is an extremely small factor in the state’s 
high technology economy, dwarfed on the negative side by offshore job flight, and 
dwarfed in both good years and bad by the net impact of workplaces growing, shrinking, 
being born, and dying.
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The solutions are: 1) to ensure that expenditures for incentives do not starve funding 
for public goods that benefit all employers (and thereby make them more loyal to the 
state); and 2) to intentionally retool incentives and technical assistance programs (and 
overall spending for them) so that they reinforce ties between employers and place-based 
institutions (both public and private) and the ties companies in the state have with each 
other. 
By addressing the business basics that really count in site location decision-making—
skilled labor supply, infrastructure, proximity to suppliers and customers, access to 
technical assistance for broadly needed services—the state can ensure that the greatest 
number of employers derive more value from being in Pennsylvania. That, in turn 
enhances the likelihood of births and expansions, where all of the net high-tech job 
creation has been occurring.
5. Make the “Investment Tracker” a Functional Tool for Analysis
State transparency in economic development is best accomplished in two ways: through 
detailed online disclosure of the costs and benefits of each deal, and by a big-picture 
compilation and analysis of spending data, known as a Unified Development Budget (see 
next policy recommendation).
By online disclosure, we mean:
annual reporting of the costs and benefits of each company-specific deal: the value 	
of the subsidies granted, the original commitments on job creation, wage levels, 
benefit levels (and possibly capital investment); 
information on the address of the project site where monies are used and on the 	
industry (the NAICS code) of the facility—so that the public can evaluate whether 
deals went to places and sectors that make sense; and
information on outcomes—jobs, wages, benefits (and investment) actually 	
delivered to date.
The Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development’s “Investment 
Tracker” website reports on more than 240 state programs. In a 2007 report by Good 
Jobs First, it was ranked 12th among the states for on-line information about job subsidies 
(but only 23 states then had any online reporting). However, there are critical gaps in the 
Investment Tracker reports: information is inadequate or lacking on wages and benefits, 
where the money is applied geographically (i.e., does it fuel sprawl?), the industry of the 
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recipient company, and whether companies actually deliver jobs that were promised. The 
Tracker’s format also makes it difficult to download the mountain of (flawed) information 
into a data set for analysis.  
Being inundated with too much (low-quality) data can be as disempowering as having 
too little. To make the Investment Tracker a functional tool, the state should improve its 
disclosure requirements and website to fill these data gaps and fix this download flaw. 
6. Create a Unified Development Budget
To complement an enhanced deal-specific disclosure website, we also recommend a 
Unified Development Budget (UDB): an annual report to the state legislature which 
catalogs and analyzes all forms of state spending for economic development—all 
appropriations and all “tax expenditures” (i.e., tax credits and exemptions). 
In addition to accounting for each line item, an interpretive UDB groups programs into 
forms of spending (e.g., workforce development, small business assistance, research 
and development) and also analyzes the spending trends of programs and program 
categories.141 
The point here is for legislators to see the big picture, and the patterns and trends within 
it, so they can effectively execute their priorities via the budget. For example, overall tax 
expenditures typically dwarf appropriations, but tax breaks are often poorly accounted 
for and therefore don’t receive the same level of scrutiny as appropriations. (They are 
also less likely to get audited or sunsetted.) Spending for workforce development, which 
should properly be considered part of economic development, is often put in another 
budget “silo” and is usually a tiny fraction of bricks-and-mortar subsidies. 
7. Consider More Support for Small, Local and Young Businesses
Because of inadequate disclosure, it is not possible to quantitatively compare 
Pennsylvania with the other states on its level of support for small, local and 
young businesses versus its subsidies to large companies. But it is evident that the 
Commonwealth—through programs such as the Ben Franklin Technology Partnership 
and its manufacturing extension program (the Industrial Resource Centers)—has long 
understood the value of aiding small and young businesses. 
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With the aid of a Unified Development Budget, we recommend that Pennsylvania assess 
its actual spending priorities and consider increasing such efforts. Also relevant here is 
whether program rules seek to intentionally benefit businesses that are locally based. 
There is a small but convincing body of evidence that locally owned businesses procure 
more, pay more, bank more, and participate more locally than do branch establishments 
of national companies.142 However, according to a forthcoming study on the allocation 
of economic development incentives in 15 states (not including Pennsylvania), there is a 
profound bias against locally owned businesses.143 
  
8. On Job Flight, Focus on Federal Trade Policy
Especially in manufacturing jobs, the number of jobs lost offshore is dozens of times 
greater than the number lost to other states. Runaway shops are a federal trade policy 
issue; they are not—and cannot be—much influenced by state taxes or incentives. The 
place to seek redress on this problem is with Pennsylvania’s congressional delegation.
Admittedly the need to replace lost jobs becomes the concern of state and local 
economic development officials, but the point here for economic development policy 
is to ensure that incentives, especially tax-based subsidies, are not misunderstood as 
a remedy for globalization-driven job flight. Tax breaks cannot begin to offset the cost 
savings companies typically enjoy by going offshore; revenue needed to sustain public 
goods should not be lost in a misguided effort to overcome offshoring. 
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